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ABSTRACT PAGE 
In today's highly networked world, computer intrusions and other attacks area constant 
threat. The detection of such attacks, especially attacks that are new or previously 
unknown, is important to secure networks and computers. A major focus of current 
research efforts in this area is on anomaly detection. 
In this dissertation, we explore applications of information theory and statistical learning to 
anomaly detection. Specifically, we look at two difficult detection problems in network and 
system security, (1) detecting covert channels, and (2) determining if a user is a human or 
bot. We link both of these problems to entropy, a measure of randomness, information 
content, or complexity, a concept that is central to information theory. The behavior of bats 
is low in entropy when tasks are rigidly repeated or high in entropy when behavior is 
pseudo-random. In contrast, human behavior is complex and medium in entropy. Similarly, 
covert channels either create regularity, resulting in low entropy, or encode extra 
information, resulting in high entropy. Meanwhile, legitimate traffic is characterized by 
complex interdependencies and moderate entropy. In addition, we utilize statistical learning 
algorithms, Bayesian learning, neural networks, and maximum likelihood estimation, in 
both modeling and detecting of covert channels and bats. 
Our results using entropy and statistical learning techniques are excellent. By using 
entropy to detect covert channels, we detected three different covert timing channels that 
were not detected by previous detection methods. Then, using entropy and Bayesian 
learning to detect chat bats, we detected 1 00% of chat bats with a false positive rate of 
only 0.05% in over 1400 hours of chat traces. Lastly, using neural networks and the idea of 
human observational proofs to detect game bats, we detected 99.8% of game bats with no 
false positives in 95 hours of traces. Our work shows that a combination of entropy 
measures and statistical learning algorithms is a powerful and highly effective tool for 
anomaly detection. 
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Application of Information Theory and 
Statistical Learning to Anomaly Detection 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
As the world continues to become increasingly connected, the number of computer 
intrusions and other attacks continues to grow. As the number of attacks grows, a 
shift in hackers' motivation from "hacking for-fun" to "hacking for-profit" has made 
attacks more sophisticated and more dangerous than ever. Indeed, in 2008, reports 
show that the volume of malware grew almost three-fold [78] and attacks against 
US government networks increased by 39.7% [37]. With the threat of attack rising, 
detecting attacks---especially attacks that are new and previously unknown-is critical 
in securing networks and computers. 
In light of this trend, a major focus of current research efforts is on anomaly 
detection. The term anomaly detection refers to detecting patterns (called anomalies) 
that fall outside of the normal behavior in a system. The main benefit of anomaly 
detection is in detecting novel or so-called "zero-day" attacks, which other detection 
methods often fail to detect. As systems are most vulnerable to unknown attacks, 
anomaly detection is a critical component in securing systems against them. The 
2 
main downside to anomaly detection is false alarms, i.e., anomalies that are not real 
threats. 
In this dissertation, we explore different applications of information theory and 
statistical learning to anomaly detection. With statistical learning often being a form 
of information extraction, information theory and statistical learning are closely re-
lated. Specifically, this dissertation addresses two challenging detection problems from 
network and system security, (1) detecting covert channels, and (2) determining if a 
user is a human or a bot. While covert channels are a classic problem, dating back 
to at least the 1970s, bots are a very new problem, only from the last decade or 
so. Although two very distinct problems, both can be linked to entropy-a measure 
of randomness, information content, or complexity-a central concept in information 
theory. In two separate studies, detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, we are able to link 
covert channels and bots to entropy. The behavior of hots is low in entropy when 
their tasks are rigidly repeated or high in entropy when components of their behavior 
are randomized. By comparison, the behavior of humans is complex and medium in 
entropy. In other words, bots are simple and predictable, whereas humans are much 
more complicated. Likewise, covert channels either increase regularity, resulting in 
lower entropy, or add additional information, resulting in higher entropy. At the 
same time, legitimate (non-covert) traffic is characterized by complex interdependen-
cies and moderate entropy. In short, both hots and covert channels can be described 
by either high or low entropy. Additionally, we utilize statistical learning, including 
Bayesian learning, neural networks, and maximum likelihood estimation, to address 
3 
both problems. 
To develop better anomaly detection techniques, especially for covert channels and 
bots, we investigate different ways of using entropy measures and statistical learning 
techniques, both separate and in combination, for modeling and detecting of covert 
channels and bots. For covert channels, we design a covert timing channel, and model, 
simulate, and test three different covert timing channels, and then, we propose an 
entropy-based approach for detecting covert timing channels. For bots, we start by 
performing a large-scale measurement study of chat bots, and then, we propose a 
hybrid classification system, based on entropy and statistical learning for detecting 
chat bots. In addition, we characterize game playing in a popular online game, and 
then, we propose a game bot defense system, based on statistical learning and the 
idea of human observational proofs for detecting online game bots. Our research 
contributions are summarized as follows: 
1) Designing and Modeling Covert Timing Channels 
The exploration of advanced covert timing channel design is important to under-
stand and defend against covert timing channels. This chapter introduces a new class 
of covert timing channels, called model-based covert timing channels, which exploit 
the statistical properties of legitimate network traffic to evade detection in an effective 
manner. We design and implement an automated framework for building model-based 
covert timing channels. The framework consists of four main components: filter, an-
alyzer, encoder, and transmitter. The filter characterizes the features of legitimate 
network traffic, and the analyzer fits the observed traffic behavior to a model. Then, 
4 
the encoder and transmitter use the model to generate covert traffic and blend with 
legitimate network traffic. The framework is lightweight, and the overhead induced by 
model fitting is negligible. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we 
conduct a series of experiments in LAN and WAN environments. The experimental 
results show that model-based covert timing channels provide a significant increase in 
detection resistance with only a minor loss in capacity. 
2} Detecting Covert Timing Channels 
The detection of covert timing channels is of increasing interest in light of recent 
practice on the exploitation of covert timing channels over the Internet. However, due 
to the high variation in legitimate network traffic, detecting covert timing channels is 
a challenging task. The existing detection schemes are ineffective to detect most of 
the covert timing channels known to the security community. This chapter introduces 
a new entropy-based approach to detecting various covert timing channels. Our new 
approach is based on the observation that the creation of a covert timing channel 
has certain effects on the entropy of the original process, and hence, a change in 
the entropy of a process provides a critical clue for covert timing channel detection. 
Exploiting this observation, we investigate the use of entropy and conditional entropy 
in detecting covert timing channels. Our experimental results show that our entropy-
based approach is sensitive to the current covert timing channels, and is capable of 
detecting them in an accurate manner. 
3} Measurement and Classification of Chat Bots 
The abuse of chat services by automated programs, known as chat bats, poses a 
5 
serious threat to Internet users. Chat bots target popular chat networks to distribute 
spam and malware. In this chapter, we first conduct a series of measurements on 
a large commercial chat network. Our measurements capture a total of 14 different 
types of chat bots ranging from simple to advanced. Moreover, we observe that 
human behavior is more complex than bot behavior. Based on the measurement 
study, we propose a classification system to accurately distinguish chat bots from 
human users. The proposed classification system consists of two components: (1) an 
entropy-based classifier and (2) a machine-learning-based classifier. The two classifiers 
complement each other in chat bot detection. The entropy-based classifier is more 
accurate to detect unknown chat bots, whereas the machine-learning-based classifier 
is faster to detect known chat bots. Our experimental evaluation shows that the 
proposed classification system is highly effective in differentiating bots from humans. 
4) Detecting Online Game Bats 
The abuse of online games by automated programs, known as game bots, for gain-
ing unfair advantages has plagued millions of participating players with escalating 
severity in recent years. The current methods for distinguishing bots and humans 
are based on human interactive proofs (HIPs), such as CAPTCHAs. However, HIP-
based approaches have inherent drawbacks. In particular, they are too obtrusive to 
be tolerated by human players in a gaming context. In this chapter, we propose a 
non-interactive approach based on human observational proofs (HOPs) for continu-
ous game bot detection. HOPs differentiate bots from human players by passively 
monitoring input actions that are difficult for current bots to perform in a human-like 
6 
manner. We collect a series of user-input traces in one of the most popular online 
games, World of Warcraft. Based on the traces, we characterize the game playing 
behaviors of bots and humans. Then, we develop a HOP-based game bot defense 
system that analyzes user-input actions with a cascade-correlation neural network to 
distinguish bots from humans. The HOP system is effective in capturing current game 
bots, which raises the bar against game exploits and forces a determined adversary to 
build more complicated game bots for detection evasion in the future. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers mod-
eling covert timing channels in terms of capacity and introduces model-based covert 
timing channels. Chapter 3 describes other covert timing channels and related detec-
tion methods, and details our entropy-based approach to detection. Chapter 4 details 
our chat bot measurements and our hybrid classification system. Chapter 5 describes 
our game bot measurements and our HOP-based game bot defense system. Lastly, in 
Chapter 6 we conclude and outline possible directions for our future work. 
7 
Chapter 2 
Designing and Modeling Covert 
Timing Channels 
A covert channel is a "communication channel that can be exploited by a process 
to transfer information in a manner that violates a system's security policy" [31]. 
There are two types of covert channels: covert storage channels and covert timing 
channels. A covert storage channel manipulates the contents of a storage location 
(e.g., disk, memory, packet headers, etc.) to transfer information. A covert timing 
channel manipulates the timing or ordering of events (e.g., disk accesses, memory 
accesses, packet arrivals, etc.) to transfer information. The focus of this chapter is on 
covert timing channels. 
The potential damage of a covert timing channel is measured in terms of its capac-
ity. The capacity of covert timing channels has been increasing with the development 
of high-performance computers and high-speed networks. While covert timing chan-
8 
nels studied in the 1970s could transfer only a few bits per second [70], covert timing 
channels in modern computers can transfer several megabits per second [125]. To 
defend against covert timing channels, researchers have proposed various methods to 
detect and disrupt them. The disruption of covert timing channels manipulates traffic 
to slow or stop covert timing channels [42, 62, 61, 63, 48]. The detection of covert tim-
ing channels mainly uses statistical tests to differentiate covert traffic from legitimate 
traffic [12, 13, 19, 110, 44]. Such detection methods are somewhat successful, because 
most existing covert timing channels cause large deviations in the timing behavior 
from that of normal traffic, making them relatively easy to detect. 
In this chapter, we introduce model-based covert timing channels, which endeavor 
to evade detection by modeling and mimicking the statistical properties of legitimate 
traffic. We design and develop a framework for building model-based covert timing 
channels, in which hidden information is carried through pseudo-random values gen-
erated from a distribution function. We use the inverse distribution function and 
cumulative distribution function for encoding and decoding. The framework includes 
four components, filter, analyzer, encoder, and transmitter. The filter profiles the 
legitimate traffic, and the analyzer fits the legitimate traffic behavior to a model. 
Then, based on the model, the encoder chooses the appropriate distribution functions 
from statistical tools and traffic generation libraries to create covert timing channels. 
The distribution functions and their parameters are determined by automated model 
fitting. The process of model fitting proves very efficient and the induced overhead 
is minor. Lastly, the transmitter generates covert traffic and blends with legitimate 
9 
traffic. 
The two primary design goals of covert timing channels are high capacity and 
detection resistance. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we per-
form a series of LAN and WAN experiments to measure the capacity and detection 
resistance of our model-based covert timing channel. We estimate the capacity with 
a model and then validate the model with real experiments. Our experimental results 
show that the capacity is close to that of an optimal covert timing channel that trans-
mits in a similar condition. In previous research, it is shown that the shape [12, 13] 
and regularity [19, 110] of network traffic are important properties in the detection of 
covert timing channels. We evaluate the detection resistance of the proposed frame-
work using shape and regularity tests. The experimental results show that both tests 
fail to differentiate the model-based covert traffic from legitimate traffic. Overall, 
our model-based covert timing channel achieves strong detection resistance and high 
capacity. 
There is an arms race between covert timing channel design and detection. To 
maintain the lead, researchers need to continue to improve detection methods and 
investigate new attacks. The goal of this work is to increase the understanding of more 
advanced covert timing channel design. Our demonstration of model-based covert 
timing channels motivates the development of a more advanced detection method 
based on entropy, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
10 
2.1 Background 
In this section, we describe basic communication concepts and relate them to covert 
timing channels. Then, based on these concepts, we formulate two base cases in covert 
timing channel design. The basic problem of communication, producing a message at 
one point and reproducing that message at another point, is the same for both overt 
and covert channels, although covert channels must consider the additional problem 
of hiding communication. 
2.1.1 Basic Communication Concepts 
The capacity of a communication channel is the maximum rate that it can reliably 
transmit information. The capacity of a covert timing channel is measured in bits per 
time unit [88]. The capacity in bits per time unit Ct is defined as: 
I(X; Y) 
Ct = m_:x E(X) , 
where X is the transmitted inter-packet delays or input distribution, Y is the received 
inter-packet delays or output distribution, I(X; Y) is the mutual information between 
X andY, and E(X) is the expected time of X. 
The mutual information measures how much information is carried across the 
channel from X toY. The mutual information I(X; Y) is defined as: 
!I: I: P(y I x)P(x)logp;(~)~~l), (discrete) I(X;Y) = X y j [ P(y I x)P(x)logp;(~)~~l) dx dy, (continuous) 
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The noise, represented by the conditional probability in the above definitions, is 
defined as: 
P(y I x) = fnoise(y,x), 
where !noise is the noise probability density function, xis the transmitted inter-packet 
delays, and y is the received inter-packet delays. 
The noise distribution !noise is the probability that the transmitted inter-packet 
delay x results in the received inter-packet delay y. The specific noise distribution for 
inter-packet delays is detailed in Section 2.3.2. 
2.1.2 Base Cases in Design 
The two main goals of covert timing channel design are high capacity and detection 
resistance. There are few examples of practical implementations of covert timing 
channels in the literature, so we begin to explore the design space in terms of both 
capacity and detection resistance. The focus of our model-based covert timing channel 
is to achieve high detection resistance. In the following section, we formulate two base 
cases in covert channel design as comparison to the model-based covert timing channel. 
The first case, optimal capacity, transmits as much information as possible, sending 
hundreds or more packets per second. Such a design might not be able to achieve covert 
communication, but is useful as a theoretical upper bound. The second case, fixed 
average packet rate, sends packets at a specific fixed average packet rate, encoding 
as much information per packet as possible. The fixed average packet rate is mainly 
determined by the packet rate of legitimate traffic. 
12 
2.1.2.1 Optimal Capacity Channel 
The first design, OPtimal Capacity (OPC), uses the discrete input distribution that 
transmits information as fast as possible. The optimal capacity is dependent on the 
optimal distance between two symbols. The first symbol is (approximately) zero and 
the second symbol is non-zero, so the use of more symbols (i.e., four or eight) will 
introduce more non-zero symbols and decrease the symbol rate. The use of smaller 
distances between the two symbols increases the symbol rate and the error rate. The 
optimal distance is the point at which the increase in error rate balances the increase 
in symbol rate. 
The code operates based on two functions. The encode function is defined as: 
!0, Fencode(s) = ds = d, s=O s=l 
where s is a symbol, d8 is an inter-packet delay with a hidden symbol s, and dis the 
optimal distance between the two symbols. The decode function is defined as: 
where d8 is an inter-packet delay with a hidden symbol s. 
Channel Capacity: The channel capacity of OPC is dependent on the optimal input 
distribution and noise. The input distribution is defined as: 
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p, X =d 
P(x) = 1- p, x = 0 
0, otherwise 
where p is the probability of the symbol s = 1, and 1 - p is the probability of the 
symbols= 0. 
Therefore, the capacity of OPC is the maximum of the mutual information with 
respect to the parameters d and p of the input distribution over the expected time 
d·p: 
1 "" P(y I x)P(x) 
Ct = IIJ~ d. p ~ ~ P(y I x)P(x)log P(x)P(y) . 
X y 
2.1.2.2 Fixed-Average Packet Rate Channel 
The second design, Fixed-average Packet Rate (FPR), uses the input distribution that 
encodes as much information per packet as possible with a constraint on the average 
cost of symbols. The cost is measured in terms of the time required for symbol 
transmission. Therefore, the optimal input distribution is subject to the constraint 
on the average packet rate, i.e., the cost of symbol transmission. 
The optimal input distribution for FPR is computed with the Arimoto-Blahut al-
gorithm generalized for cost constraints [14]. The Arimoto-Blahut algorithm computes 
the optimal input distribution for capacity in bits per channel usage. The capacity in 
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bits per channel usage Cu is defined as: 
Cu =max I(X; Y). 
X 
In general, Cu and Ct do not have the same input distribution X. However, if 
the input distribution is constrained so that E(X) = c (where cis a constant), then 
the optimal input distribution X is optimal for both Cu and Ct, and Cu = Ct ·c. 
Thus, FPR transmits as much information per packet (channel usage) and per second 
(time unit) as possible with a fixed average packet rate. We use the Arimoto-Blahut 
algorithm to compute the optimal input distribution for FPR. The capacity results 
for FPR, based on the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm, are detailed in Section 2.3. 
2.2 The Framework 
The covert timing channel framework, as shown in Figure 2.1, is a pipeline that 
filters and analyzes legitimate traffic then encodes and transmits covert traffic. As 
the output of the pipeline, the covert traffic mimics the observed legitimate traffic, 
making it easy to evade detection. The components of the framework include filter, 
analyzer, encoder, and transmitter, which are detailed in the following paragraphs. 
Figure 2.1: Framework for Model-Based Covert Timing Channels. 
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MODELS: ·INPUT· 
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!PO-INTER-PACKET DELAY 
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0
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IPDs IPOs 
The filter monitors the background traffic and singles out the specific type of 
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traffic to be mimicked. The more specific application traffic the filter can identify 
and profile, the better model we can have for generating covert traffic. For example, 
FTP is an application protocol based on TCP, but generating a series of inter-packet 
delays based on a model of all TCP traffic would be a poor model for describing 
FTP behaviors. Once the specified traffic is filtered, the traffic is further classified 
into individual flows based on source and destination IP addresses. The filter then 
calculates the inter-packet delay between subsequent pair of packets from each flow, 
and forwards the results to the analyzer. 
The analyzer fits the inter-packet delays in sets of 100 packets with the Expo-
nential, Gamma, Pareto, Lognormal, Poisson, and Weibull distributions. The fitting 
process uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to determine the parameters for 
each model. The model with the smallest root mean squared error (RMSE), which 
measures the difference between the model and the estimated distribution, is chosen 
as the traffic model. The model selection is automated. Other than the set of models 
provided to the analyzer, there is no human input. The models are scored based on 
root mean squared errors, as shown in Table 2.1. The model with the lowest root 
mean squared error is the closest to the data being modeled. Since most types of 
network traffic are non-stationary [22], the analyzer supports piecewise modeling of 
non-stationary processes by adjusting the parameters of the model after each set of 
100 covert inter-packet delays. The analyzer refits the current model with new sets 
of 100 packets to adjust the parameters. The analyzer can take advantage of a larger 
selection of models to more accurately model different types of application traffic. For 
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Table 2.1: Scores for Models of HTTP Inter-Packet Delays 
model parameters root mean squared error 
Wei bull 0.0794, 0.2627 0.0032 
Gamma 0.1167, 100.8180 0.0063 
Lognormal -4.3589, 3.5359 0.0063 
Pareto 3.6751, 0.0018 0.0150 
Poisson 11.7611 0.0226 
Exponential 11.7611 0.0294 
example, if we know that the targeted traffic is well-modeled as an Erlang distribution, 
we will add this distribution to the set of models. For each of the current models, the 
computational overhead is less than 0.1 milliseconds and the storage overhead for the 
executable is less than 500 bytes, so the induced resource consumption for supporting 
additional models is not an issue. 
The filter and analyzer can be run either offline or online. In the offline mode, 
the selection of the model and parameters is based on traffic samples. The offline 
mode consumes less resources, but the model might not represent the current network 
traffic behavior well. In the online mode, the selection of the model and parameters is 
based on live traffic. The online mode consumes more resources and requires that the 
model and parameters be transmitted to the decoder with the support of a startup 
protocol, but the model better represents the current network traffic behavior. The 
startup protocol is a model determined in advance, and is used to transmit the online 
model ( 1 byte) and parameters ( 4-8 bytes) to the decoder. 
The encoder generates random covert inter-packet delays that mimic legitimate 
inter-packet delays. The input to the encoder includes the model, the message, and 
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a sequence of random numbers. Its output is a sequence of covert random inter-
packet delays. The message to be sent is separated into symbols. The symbols map 
to different random timing values based on a random code that distributes symbols 
based on the model. 
Using a sequence of random numbers r 1 , r2, ... , rn., we transform the discrete 
symbols into continuous ones. The continuization function is 
8 
Fcontinuize(8) = ( fSl + r) mod 1 = rs, 
where Sis the set of possible symbols, 8 is a symbol and r is a Uniform(0,1) random 
variable. The corresponding discretization function is: 
Fdiscretize(rs) =I S I ·((rs- r)mod 1) = 8, 
where r8 is a Uniform(0,1) random variable with a hidden symbol 8. 
The encoder and decoder start with the same seed and generate the same sequence 
of random numbers, r 1, r2, ... , rn. To maintain synchronization, the encoder and de-
coder associate the sequence of symbols with TCP sequence numbers, i.e., 8 1 with 
the first TCP sequence number, 82 with the second TCP sequence number, and so 
on. 1 Therefore, both the encoder and decoder have the same values of r through the 
sequence of symbols. The inverse distribution function F;;_~el takes a Uniform(0,1) 
random number as input and generates a random variable from the selected model 
1 With this mechanism, repacketization can cause synchronization problems, so other mechanisms 
such as "bit stuffing" [110] could be useful for synchronization. 
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as output. The sequence of transformed random numbers r81 , r82 , ... , rsn is used 
with the inverse distribution function to create random covert inter-packet delays 
d8 1, d8 2, ... , dsn· The encode function is: 
where F~;del is the inverse distribution function of the selected model. The decode 
function is: 
where Fmodel is the cumulative distribution function of the selected model, and d8 is 
a random covert inter-packet delay with a hidden symbol s. 
The transmitter sends out packets to produce the random covert inter-packet de-
lays d8 1, d8 2, ... , dsn· The receiver then decodes and discretizes them to recover the 
original symbols s1, s2, ... , Sn· 
2.2.1 Model-Based Channel Capacity 
The model-based channel capacity is also dependent on the input distribution and 
noise. The input distribution is defined as: 
P(x) = fmodel(x) 
where !model is the probability density function of the selected model. 
Therefore, the capacity of the model-based channel is the mutual information over 
the expected time E(X): 
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1 J J P(y I x)P(x) 
Ct = E(X) P(y I x)P(x)log P(x)P(y) . 
X y 
2.2.2 Implementation Details 
We implement the proposed framework using C and MATLAB in Unix/Linux environ-
ments. The components run as user-space processes, while access to tcpdump is re-
quired. The filter is written in C and runs tcpdump with a user-specified filtering 
expression to read the stream of packets. The filter processes the traffic stream and 
computes the inter-packet delays based on the packet timestamps. The analyzer is 
written in MATLAB and utilizes the fitting functions from the statistics toolbox for 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
The encoder is written in C, and uses random number generation and random 
variable models from the Park-Leemis [71] simulation C libraries. The transmitter is 
also written in C, with some inline assembly, and uses the Socket API. The timing 
mechanism used is the Pentium CPU Time-Stamp Counter, which is accessed by 
calling the RDTSC (Read Time-Stamp Counter) instruction. The RDTSC instruction 
has excellent resolution and low overhead, but must be calibrated to be used as a 
general purpose timing mechanism. The usleep and nanosleep functions force a 
context switch, which delays the packet transmission with small inter-packet delays, 
so these functions are not used. 
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2.3 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of a model-based covert timing channel 
built from our framework. The OPC and FPR covert timing channels, discussed in 
Section 2.1, are used as points of comparison. In particular, we examine the capacity 
and detection resistance of each covert timing channel. 
2.3.1 Experimental Setup 
The defensive perimeter of a network, composed of firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems, is responsible for protecting the network. Typically, only a few specific ap-
plication protocols, such as HTTP and SMTP, are commonly allowed to pass through 
the defensive perimeter. We utilize outgoing HTTP inter-packet delays as the medium 
to build model-based covert timing channels, due to the wide acceptance of HTTP 
traffic for crossing the network perimeter. We refer to the model-based HTTP covert 
timing channel as MB-HTTP. 
2.3.1.1 Testing Scenarios 
There are three different testing scenarios in our experimental evaluation. The first 
scenario is in a LAN environment, a medium-size campus network with subnets for 
administration, departments, and residences. The LAN connection is between two ma-
chines, located in different subnets. The connection passes through several switches, 
the routers inside the campus network, and a firewall device that protects each sub-
net. The other two scenarios are in WAN environments. The first WAN connection is 
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between two machines, both are on the east coast of the United States but in different 
states. One is on a residential cable network and the other is on a medium-size cam-
pus network. The second WAN connection is between two machines on the opposite 
coasts of the United States, one on the east coast and the other on the west coast. 
Both machines are on campus networks. 
Table 2 2· Network Conditions for Test Scenarios 
LAN WAN E-E WANE-W 
distance 0.3 miles 525 miles 2660 miles 
RTT 1.766ms 59.647ms 87.236ms 
IPDV 2.5822e-05 2.4124e-03 2.1771e-04 
hops 3 18 13 
IPDV - inter-packet delay variation 
The network conditions for different experiment scenarios are summarized in Table 
2.2. The two-way round-trip time (RTT) is measured using the ping command. We 
compute the one-way inter-packet delay variation based on the delays between packets 
leaving the source and arriving at the destination. The inter-packet delay variations 
of the three connections span three orders of magnitude, from 1 x 10-3 to 1 x 10-5 . 
The LAN connection has the lowest inter-packet delay variation and the two WAN 
connections have higher inter-packet delay variation, as expected. The WAN E-E 
connection is shorter and has smaller RTT time than the WAN E-W connection. 
However, WAN E-E has higher inter-packet delay variation than WAN E-W, due 
to more traversed hops. This implies that the inter-packet delays variation is more 
sensitive to the number of hops than the physical distance and RTT between two 
machines. 
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2.3.1.2 Building MB-HTTP 
We install the components of the framework on the testing machines. The filter dis-
tinguishes the outgoing HTTP traffic from background traffic. The analyzer observes 
10 million HTTP inter-packet delays, then fits the HTTP inter-packet delays to the 
models, as described in Section 2.2. The fitting functions use maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) to determine the parameters for each model. The model with the 
best root mean squared error (RMSE), a measure of the difference between the model 
and the distribution being estimated, is chosen as the traffic model. 
For the HTTP inter-packet delays, the analyzer selects the Weibull distribution 
based on the root mean squared error. Note that HTTP inter-packet delays have been 
shown to be well approximated by a Weibull distribution [22]. The Weibull probability 
distribution function is: 
The parameters, which vary for each set of 100 packets, have a mean scale parameter 
A of 0.0371 and a mean shape parameter k of 0.3010. With these parameters, the 
mean inter-packet delay is 0.3385, approximately 3 packets per second. 
2.3.1.3 Formulating OPC and FPR 
The average packet rate for FPR is fixed at 0_3185 = 2.954 packets per second, based 
on the average packet rate of HTTP traffic. We use the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm 
to compute the optimal input distribution, with the average packet rate of 2.954 as 
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Table 2.3: Mean Packets/Second and Inter-Packet Delay for OPC 
LAN WANE-E WANE-W 
channel PPS I IPD PPS I IPD PPS I IPD 
OPC 12,777.98 I 7.87e-05 137.48 I 7.31e-03 1,515.56 I 6.63e-04 
PPS- mean packets per second, IPD- mean inter-packet delay 
the cost constraint. The optimal input distribution balances high cost symbols with 
low probabilities and low cost symbols with high probabilities, such that the average 
cost constraint is satisfied. The constraint can be satisfied for infinitely large symbols 
with infinitely small probabilities, and hence, the optimal input distribution decays 
exponentially to infinity. The results of the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm, as the number 
of intervals increases, reduce to an Exponential distribution with an inverse scale 
parameter of>.= 2.954. The Exponential probability distribution function is: 
We compute the optimal distance between packets for OPC based on the noise 
distribution. The optimal distance between packets and the average packet rate for 
OPC is shown in Table 2.3. For connections with higher inter-packet delay variation, 
OPC increases the time elapse between packets to make the inter-packet delays easier 
to distinguish, and, as a result, lowers the average number of packets per second. 
2.3.2 Capacity 
The definition of capacity allows us to estimate the capacity of each covert timing 
channel based on the network conditions of each connection. In previous research [138], 
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the inter-packet delay differences have been shown to be well-modeled by a Laplace 
distribution. The probability density function of the Laplace distribution is: 
The setting of the scale parameter b is based on the inter-packet delay variation 
for each connection. The variation of the Laplace distribution is a 2 = 2b2 • Therefore, 
we set b to: 
where a 2 is the inter-packet delay variation for each connection. 
Table 2.4: Theoretical Capacity for Covert Timing Channels 
LAN WANE-E WANE-W 
channel CPP CPS CPP CPS CPP CPS 
MB-HTTP 9.39 27.76 4.12 12.19 6.84 20.21 
FPR 12.63 37.32 6.15 18.17 9.59 28.35 
OPC 0.50 6395.39 0.50 68.80 0.50 758.54 
CPP - capacity per packet, CPS - capacity per second 
The results, in terms of capacity per packet and capacity per second, are shown 
in Table 2.4. While OPC has the highest capacity, it is the least efficient in terms 
of capacity per packet. Furthermore, with the large number of packets per second, it 
can be easily detected by most intrusion detection systems. 
The capacity of MB-HTTP is 67% to 74% of that of FPR, with larger differences 
for connections with high inter-packet delay variation than for those with low inter-
packet delay variation. The Weibull distribution has a larger proportion of very small 
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values than the Exponential distribution. As a result, MB-HTTP uses more small 
values than FPR and benefits more from lower inter-packet delay variation. 
The theoretical capacity is somewhat optimistic. The model only considers the 
noise introduced after packets leave the transmitter. With the real covert timing 
channels, noise is introduced before packets leave the transmitter. The transmitter 
is sometimes not able to transmit at the appropriate times, due to slow processing, 
context switches, etc. Thus, the actual distance between packets can increase or 
decrease from the intended distance as the packets are transmitted. 
2.3.2.1 Empirical Capacity 
To evaluate the channel capacity in practice, we run covert timing channels on each 
connection. The channels are configured to transmit 16,000 random bits of informa-
tion. For FPR and MB-HTTP, the number of bits encoded per packet is set to 16 
(i.e., 216 = 65,536 different values), while OPC transmits a single bit per packet. 
During these tests, we measure the bit error rate of each covert timing channel from 
the most significant bit to the least significant bit of each packet. The most significant 
bit represents a large part of the inter-packet delay, where the least significant bit 
represents a small part of the inter-packet delay. While flipping the most significant 
bit causes a difference in seconds or tenths of seconds, changing the least significant 
bit means a difference only in milliseconds or microseconds. In other words, the higher 
the number of bits encoded per packet, the smaller the precision of the lowest order 
bits. Interestingly, encoding at 16 bits per packet and decoding at 8 bits per packet 
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Figure 2.2: Empirical Capacity and Bit Error Rates for WAN E-E and WAN E-W 
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produces the most significant 8 bits of the 16 bit code. 
To determine the transmission rate with error correction, we measure the empirical 
capacity of each bit as a binary symmetric channel. The binary symmetric channel is 
a special case where the channel has two symbols of equal probability. The capacity 
of a binary symmetric channel is: 
C = I(X;Y) = 1- (p logp+q logq), 
where p is the probability of a correct bit and q 1 - p is the probability of an 
incorrect bit. 
The empirical capacity and bit error rate for each bit, from the most significant to 
the least significant, are shown in Figure 2.2. The empirical capacity per bit degrades 
as the bit error rates increase. The total capacity of the channel is the summation 
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of the capacity for each bit. For MB-HTTP, the bit error rate increases somewhat 
linearly. For FPR, the bit error rate accelerates gradually, eventually overtaking the 
bit error rates of MB-HTTP, though at this point the capacity per bit is insignificant. 
Table 2.5: Empirical Capacity for Covert Timing Channels 
LAN WANE-E WANE-W 
channel ECPP ECPS ECPP ECPS ECPP ECPS 
MB-HTTP 6.74 19.93 2.15 6.35 5.18 15.31 
FPR 10.95 32.35 4.63 13.67 9.37 27.69 
OPC 0.85 10,899.62 0.66 91.28 0.98 1,512.53 
ECPP - empirical capacity per packet, ECPS - empirical capacity per second 
The empirical capacity of each covert timing channel is shown in Table 2.5. The 
empirical capacity of MB-HTTP is still about 46% to 61% of that of FPR, somewhat 
lower than the case in the theoretical model. This is because a larger proportion of 
MB-HTTP traffic has small inter-packet delays than that of FPR, and small inter-
packet delays are more sensitive to noise caused by transmission delays (i.e., slow 
processing, context switches, etc.) than large inter-packet delays, which is not repre-
sented in the theoretical model. 
2.3.3 Detection Resistance 
The detection resistance, as described in Section 2.1, is estimated based on the shape 
and regularity tests. To examine the shape of the distribution, we use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test [36], which is a non-parametric goodness-of-fit test. To examine the 
regularity of the traffic, we use the regularity test [19], which studies the variance of 
the traffic pattern. In this section, we detail these two tests and show the detection 
resistance of MB-HTTP against both tests. 
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2.3.3.1 Shape Tests 
The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test determines whether or not two samples 
come from the same distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is distribution free, 
meaning the test is not dependent on a specific distribution. Thus, it is applicable to 
a variety of types of traffic with different distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
statistic measures the maximum distance between two empirical distribution func-
tions. 
KSTEST =max I S1(x)- S2(x) I, 
where sl and 82 are the empirical distribution functions of the two samples. 
In our experiments, we test a large set of legitimate inter-packet delays against a 
sample of either covert or legitimate inter-packet delays. The large set is a training 
set of 10,000,000 HTTP inter-packet delays. The training set is used to represent the 
normal behavior of the HTTP protocol. 
The test score by comparing the two sets is used to determine if the sample is 
covert or legitimate. A small score indicates that the behavior is close to normal. 
However, if the test score is large, i.e., the sample does not fit the normal behavior of 
the protocol, it indicates a potential covert timing channel. 
Table 2.6: Mean and Standard Deviation of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Scores 
LEGIT-HTTP MB-HTTP FPR OPC 
sample size mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev 
100x 2,000 .193 .110 .196 .093 .925 .002 .999 .000 
100x 10,000 .141 .103 .157 .087 .925 .001 .999 .000 
100x 50,000 .096 .088 .122 .073 .924 .000 .999 .000 
lOOx 250,000 .069 .066 .096 .036 .924 .000 .999 .000 
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Scores 
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is run 100 times for each of 2,000, 10,000, 50,000, 
and 250,000 packet samples of legitimate and covert traffic from each covert timing 
channel. The mean and standard deviation of the test scores are shown in Table 2.6. 
For FPR and OPC, the mean scores are over 0.90 and the standard deviations are 
extremely low, indicating that the test can reliably differentiate both covert timing 
channels from normal HTTP traffic. By contrast, the mean scores for MB-HTTP 
samples are very close to those of legitimate samples. The mean scores are for 100 
tests, which in total include as many as 25 million (250,000 x 100) inter-packet delays. 
The distribution of individual test scores is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
Table 2. 7: False Positive and True Positive Rates for Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
LEGIT MB-HTTP FPR OPC 
sample size cutoff false pos. true pos. true pos. true pos. 
100x 2,000 KSTEST ~ .66 .01 .01 1.00 1.00 
100x 10,000 KSTEST ~ .65 .01 .01 1.00 1.00 
100x 50,000 KSTEST ~ .41 .01 .01 1.00 1.00 
100x 250,000 KSTEST ~ .21 .01 .02 1.00 1.00 
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The detection resistance based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is shown in Table 
2.7. The targeted false positive rate is 0.01. To achieve this false positive rate, the 
cutoff scores-the scores that decide whether samples are legitimate or covert-are 
set at the 99th percentile of legitimate sample scores. The true positive rates, based 
on the cutoff scores, are then shown for each covert timing channel. Since the true 
positive rates in all 100 tests are 1.00, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test detects FPR and 
OPC easily. However, the true positive rates for MB-HTTP are approximately the 
same as the false positive rates. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot differentiate 
between MB-HTTP and legitimate samples. Such a result can be explained based 
on the distribution of individual test scores, which is shown in Figure 2.3. While 
the mean scores of MB-HTTP traffic in Table 2.6 are slightly higher than those of 
LEGIT-HTTP, the distributions of individual scores overlap so that the false positive 
rate and true positive rate are approximately equal. 
2.3.3.2 Regularity Tests 
The regularity test [19] determines whether the variance of the inter-packet delays is 
relatively constant or not. This test is based on the observation that for most types 
of network traffic, the variance of the inter-packet delays changes over time. With 
covert timing channels, the code used to transmit data is a regular process and, as a 
result, the variance of the inter-packet delays remains relatively constant over time. 
In our experiments, we test the regularity of a sample of either covert or legitimate 
inter-packet delays. The sample is separated into sets of winter-packet delays. Then, 
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for each set, the standard deviation of the set Ui is computed. The regularity is the 
standard deviation of the pairwise differences between each ui and Uj for all sets i < j. 
regularity= ST DEV( I ui- Uj I, i < j, 'Vi, j) 
!Ji 
The regularity test is run 100 times for 2,000 packet samples of legitimate and covert 
samples from each covert timing channel. The window sizes of w = 100 and w = 250 
are used. The mean regularity scores are shown in Table 2.8. If the regularity is small, 
the sample is highly regular, indicating a potential covert timing channel. 
Table 2.8: Mean of Regularity Test Scores 
sample size LEGIT-HTTP MB-HTTP FPR OPC 
lOOx 2,000 w=100 43.80 38.21 0.34 0.00 
lOOx 2,000 w=250 23.74 22.87 0.26 0.00 
The mean regularity scores for OPC are 0.0 for both tests, indicating regular 
behavior. There are two values, each with 0.5 probability. Therefore, the standard 
deviation within sets is small u = 0.5d = 3.317e - 4, and there is no detectable 
change in the standard deviation between sets. The mean regularity score for FPR 
is small as well, showing that the test is able to detect the regular behavior. While 
the standard deviation of FPR, which is based on the Exponential distribution, is 
u = >. = 0.3385, the code is a regular process, so the variance of the inter-packet 
delays remains relatively constant. 
The mean regularity scores for MB-HTTP are close to those of legitimate samples. 
This is because the parameters are recalibrated after each set of 100 packets, as 
described in Section 2.2. The parameters of the distribution determine the mean and 
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standard deviation, so adjusting the parameters changes the variance after each set 
of 100 inter-packet delays. As a result, like legitimate traffic, the variance of the 
inter-packet delays appears irregular. 
Table 2.9: False Positive and True Positive Rates for Regularity Test 
LEGIT MB-HTTP FPR OPC 
sample size cutoff false pos. true pos . true pos. true pos. 
lOOx 2,000 w=lOO reg.::::; 6.90 . 01 .00 1.00 1.00 
lOOx 2,000 w=250 reg.::::; 5.20 .01 .00 1.00 1.00 
The detection resistance based on the regularity test is shown in Table 2.9. The 
targeted false positive rate is 0.01. The cutoff scores are set at the 1st percentile of 
legitimate sample scores, in order to achieve this false positive rate. The true positive 
rates, based on the cutoff scores, are then shown for each covert timing channels. The 
regularity test is able to detect FPR and OPC in all 100 tests. The resulting true 
positive rates for MB-HTTP are approximately the same as the false positive rate. 
Basically, the test is no better than random guessing at detecting MB-HTTP. 
2.4 Conclusion 
We introduced model-based covert timing channels, which mimic the observed behav-
ior of legitimate network traffic to evade detection. We presented a framework for 
building such model-based covert timing channels. The framework consists of four 
components: filter, analyzer, encoder, and transmitter. The filter characterizes the 
specific features of legitimate traffic that are of interest. The analyzer fits the traffic to 
several models and selects the model with the best fit. The encoder generates random 
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covert inter-packet delays that, based on the model, mimic the legitimate traffic. The 
transmitter then manipulates the timing of packets to create the model-based covert 
timing channel. 
Using channel capacity and detection resistance as major metrics, we evaluated 
the proposed framework in both LAN and WAN environments. Our capacity results 
suggest that model-based covert timing channels work efficiently even in the coast-
to-coast scenario. Our detection resistance results show that, for both shape and 
regularity tests, covert traffic is sufficiently similar to legitimate traffic that current 
detection methods cannot differentiate them. In contrast, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and regularity tests easily detect FPR and OPC. 
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Chapter 3 
Detecting Covert Timing 
Channels 
3.1 Introduction 
As an effective way to exfiltrate data from a well-protected network, a covert timing 
channel manipulates the timing or ordering of network events (e.g., packet arrivals) 
for secret information transfer over the Internet, even without compromising an end-
host inside the network. On the one hand, such information leakage caused by a 
covert timing channel poses a serious threat to Internet users. Their secret credentials 
like passwords and keys could be stolen through a covert timing channel without 
much difficulty. On the other hand, detecting covert timing channels is a well-known 
challenging task in the security community. 
In general, the detection of covert timing channels uses statistical tests to differ-
entiate covert traffic from legitimate traffic. However, due to the high variation in 
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legitimate network traffic, detection methods based on standard statistical tests are 
not accurate and robust in capturing a covert timing channel. Although there have 
been recent research efforts on detecting covert timing channels over the Internet 
[18, 19, 110, 75, 45], some detection methods are designed to target one specific covert 
timing channel and therefore fail to detect other types of covert timing channels; the 
other detection methods are broader in detection but are over-sensitive to the high 
variation of network traffic. In short, none of the previous detection methods are 
effective at detecting a variety of covert timing channels. 
In this chapter, we propose a new entropy-based approach to detecting covert 
timing channels. The entropy of a process is a measure of uncertainty or information 
content, a concept that is of great importance in information and communication 
theory [111]. While entropy has been used in covert timing channel capacity analysis, 
it has never been used to detect covert timing channels. We observe that a covert 
timing channel cannot be created without causing some effects on the entropy of the 
original process1 . Therefore, a change in the entropy of a process provides a critical 
clue for covert timing channel detection. 
More specifically, we investigate the use of entropy and conditional entropy in 
detecting covert timing channels. For finite samples, the exact entropy rate of a 
process cannot be measured and must be estimated. Thus, we estimate the entropy 
rate with the corrected conditional entropy, a measure used on biological processes 
[101]. The corrected conditional entropy is designed to be accurate with limited data, 
1 This observation applies to complex processes, like network traffic, but not to simple independent 
and identically distributed processes (20]. 
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which makes it excellent for small samples of network data. To evaluate our new 
entropy-based approach, we conduct a series of experiments to validate whether our 
approach is capable of differentiating covert traffic from legitimate traffic. We perform 
the fine-binned estimation of entropy and the coarse-binned estimation of corrected 
conditional entropy for both covert and legitimate samples. We then determine false 
positive and true positive rates for both types of estimations. Our experimental 
results show that the combination of entropy and corrected conditional entropy is 
very effective in detecting covert timing channels. 
3.2 Background And Related Work 
To defend against covert timing channels, researchers have proposed different solu-
tions to detect, disrupt, and eliminate covert traffic. The disruption of covert timing 
channels adds random delays to traffic, which reduces the capacity of covert timing 
channels but degrades system performance as well. The detection of covert timing 
channels is accomplished using statistical tests to differentiate covert traffic from le-
gitimate traffic. While the focus of earlier work is on disrupting covert timing channels 
[48, 58, 62, 61, 63] or on eliminating them in the design of systems [1, 65, 66], more 
recent research has begun to investigate the design and detection of covert timing chan-
nels [18, 19, 110, 75, 76, 45, 109]. In the following subsections, we give an overview of 
recent research on covert timing channels and detection tests. 
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3.2.1 Covert Timing Channels 
There are two types of covert timing channels: active and passive. In terms of covert 
timing channels, active refers to covert timing channels that generate additional traffic 
to transmit information, while passive refers to covert timing channels that manipulate 
the timing of existing traffic. In general, active covert timing channels are faster, but 
passive covert timing channels are more difficult to detect. On the other hand, active 
covert timing channels often require a compromised machine, whereas passive covert 
timing channels, if creatively positioned, do not. The majority of the covert timing 
channels discussed in this section are active covert timing channels, except where 
stated otherwise. 
Figure 3.1: IPCTC/TRCTC/MBCTC Scenario 
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3.2.1.1 IP Covert Timing Channel 
Cabuk et al. [19] developed the first IP covert timing channel, which we refer to as 
IPCTC, and investigated a number of design issues. A scenario where IPCTC can be 
used is illustrated in Figure 3.1. In this scenario, a machine is compromised, and the 
defensive perimeter, represented as a perimeter firewall or intrusion detection system, 
monitors communication with the outside. Therefore, a covert timing channel can 
be used to pass through the defensive perimeter undetected. IPCTC uses a simple 
interval-based encoding scheme to transmit information. IPCTC transmits a 1-bit by 
sending a packet during an interval and transmits a O-bit by not sending a packet 
during an interval. A major advantage to this scheme is that when a packet is lost, a 
bit is flipped but synchronization is not affected. The timing-interval t and the number 
of O-bits between two 1-bits determines the distribution of IPCTC inter-packet delays. 
It is interesting to note that if the pattern of bits is uniform, the distribution of inter-
packet delays is close to a Geometric distribution. To avoid creating a pattern of 
inter-packet delays at multiples of a single t, the timing-interval t is rotated among 
different values. 
3.2.1.2 Time-Replay Covert Timing Channel 
Cabuk [18] later designed a more advanced covert timing channel based on a replay 
attack, which we refer to as TRCTC. TRCTC uses a sample of legitimate traffic Sin 
as input and replays Sin to transmit information. Sin is partitioned into two equal 
bins So and S1 by a value tcutoff· TRCTC transmits a 1-bit by randomly replaying 
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an inter-packet delay from bin S1 and transmits a O-bit by randomly replaying an 
inter-packet delay from bin S0 . Thus, as Sin is made up of legitimate traffic, the 
distribution of TRCTC traffic is approximately equal to the distribution of legitimate 
traffic. 
3.2.1.3 Model-Based Covert Timing Channel 
Gianvecchio et al. [45] developed an automated framework for building model-based 
covert timing channels, which we refer to as MBCTC, to mimic legitimate traffic. 
MBCTC fits a sample of legitimate traffic to several models, such as Exponential 
or Weibull, and selects the model with the best fit. MBCTC then uses the inverse 
distribution function and cumulative distribution function for the selected model as 
encoding and decoding functions. Based on the inverse transform method for variate 
generation [71], MBCTC transmits by generating pseudo-random inter-packet delays 
with hidden information embedded. Thus, as the distribution of the pseudo-random 
inter-packet delays is determined by the model that approximates legitimate traffic, 
the distribution of MBCTC is close to that of legitimate traffic. To better model 
changes in the traffic, MBCTC refits the model in sets of 100 packets. 
3.2.1.4 JitterBug 
Shah et al. [110] developed a keyboard device called JitterBug that slowly leaks typed 
information over the network. JitterBug is a passive covert timing channel, so new 
traffic is not created to transmit information. JitterBug demonstrates how a passive 
covert timing channel can be positioned so that the target machine does not need 
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to be compromised. A scenario where JitterBug can be used is illustrated in Figure 
3.2. In this scenario, an input device is compromised, and the attacker is able to 
leak typed information over the network. JitterBug operates by creating small delays 
in keypresses to affect the inter-packet delays of a networked application. JitterBug 
transmits a 1-bit by increasing an inter-packet delay to a value modulo w milliseconds 
and transmits a O-bit by increasing an inter-packet delay to a value modulo f~l 
milliseconds. The timing-window w determines the maximum delay that JitterBug 
adds to an inter-packet delay. For small values of w, the distribution of JitterBug 
traffic is very similar to that of the original legitimate traffic. To avoid creating a 
pattern of inter-packet delays at multiples of W and r~l, a random sequence Si is 
subtracted from the original inter-packet delay before the modulo operation. 
3.2.1.5 Other Covert Timing Channels 
Berk et al. [13] implemented a simple binary covert timing channel based on the 
Arimoto-Blahut algorithm, which computes the input distribution that maximizes the 
channel capacity [?, 14]. L uo et al. [75] designed a combinatorics-based scheme, called 
Cloak, to transmit information in the ordering of packets within different flows. Cloak 
can be considered as a storage and timing channel, as the encoding methods require 
packets and/or flows to be distinguishable by their contents. The same authors also 
proposed a covert timing channel based on the timing of TCP bursts [76]. Similar to 
Cloak, El-Atawy et al. [38] built a covert timing channel based on packet ordering and 
showed how code selection can make this technique effective at evading packet order 
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metrics. Sellke et. al [109] showed that with i.i.d. traffic as cover, it is theoretically 
possible to create "provably secure" covert timing channels, i.e., covert timing channels 
that are computationally non-detectable. The same basic proof as [109] can be used to 
show that TRCTC is computationally non-detectable for i.i.d. cover traffic when its 
input messages are XOR'd with cryptographically-secure random numbers. Although 
not a covert timing channel, Giffin et al. [47] showed that low-order bits of the TCP 
timestamp can be exploited to create a covert storage channel, which is related to 
timing channels due to the shared statistical properties of timestamps and packet 
timing. 
3.2.1.6 Timing-Based Watermarks 
A number of efforts have investigated timing-based watermarking systems [124, 122, 
97, 123, 136, 55], which are related to covert timing channels. A timing-based water-
marking system is basically a side-channel that is augmented by a low-capacity covert 
timing channel. Wang et al. [122] proposed a method for watermarking inter-packet 
delays to track anonymous peer-to-peer voice-over-IP (VoiP) calls. More recently, 
Houmansadr et. al [55] proposed a subtle watermark called RAINBOW that is non-
blind, i.e., it records both incoming and outgoing flows, allowing it to differentiate 
flows by adding only small delays. By doing so, RAINBOW is able to evade sev-
eral detection tests, including entropy-based methods. However, the assumptions of 
timing-based watermarking systems, like RAINBOW, are quite different than those 
of covert timing channels. The entropy, if any, that is added by a watermarking sys-
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tern can be very small. For example, if a set of flows are naturally differentiable, 
a watermarking system need not add any delays to differentiate them. Generally, 
timing-based watermarking systems are passive timing channels in that new traffic 
is not created. Such systems again demonstrate how a passive timing channel can 
be positioned so that the target, i.e., the anonymizing network, does not need to be 
compromised. 
3.2.2 Detection Tests 
There are two broad classes of detection tests: shape tests and regularity tests. The 
shape of traffic is described by first-order statistics, e.g., mean, variance, and distri-
bution. The regularity of traffic is described by second or higher-order statistics, e.g., 
correlations in the data. Note that in previous research the term regularity is some-
times used to refer to frequency-domain regularity [19, 110], whereas here we use this 
term exclusively to refer to time-domain regularity, i.e., the regularity of a process 
over time. 
3.2.2.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
Peng et al. [97] showed that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is effective to detect wa-
termarked inter-packet delays, a form of timing channel [124]. The watermarked 
inter-packet delays are shown to have a distribution that is the sum of a normal and 
a uniform distribution. Thus, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be used to deter-
mine if a sample comes from the appropriate distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test determines whether or not two samples (or a sample and a distribution) differ. 
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The use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to detect covert timing channels is described 
in more detail in Section 3.4.1.2. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is distribution free, 
i.e., the test is not dependent on a specific distribution. Thus, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is applicable to different types of traffic with different distributions. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic measures the maximum distance between two 
empirical distribution functions: 
KSTEST =max I St(x)- S2(x) I, (3.1) 
where St and 82 are the empirical distribution functions of the two samples. 
3.2.2.2 Regularity Test 
Cabuk et al. [19] investigated a method of detecting covert timing channels based 
on regularity. This detection method, referred to as the regularity test, determines 
whether or not the variance of the inter-packet delays is relatively constant. This 
detection test is based on the fact that for most network traffic, the variance of the 
inter-packet delays changes over time, whereas with covert timing channels, if the 
encoding scheme does not change over time, then the variance of the inter-packet 
delays remains relatively constant. The use of the regularity test to detect covert 
timing channels is discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.1.2. For the regularity test, 
a sample is separated into sets of w inter-packet delays. Then, for each set, the 
standard deviation of the set ai is computed. The regularity is the standard deviation 
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of the pairwise differences between each ai and aj for all sets i < j. 
regularity= STDEV (' ai ~i aj I, i < j, Vi,j) (3.2) 
3.2.2.3 Other Detection Tests 
Cabuk et al. [19) investigated a second method of detecting covert timing channels, 
referred to as E-similarity, based on measuring the proportion of similar inter-packet 
delays. The E-similarity test is based on the fact that IPCTC creates clusters of similar 
inter-packet delays at multiples of the timing-interval. Luo et al. [75) developed a 
detection method that targets the Cloak channel by measuring the intervals between 
acknowledgment and data packets. While both detection methods are effective at 
detecting the specific covert timing channels for which they are designed, namely 
IPCTC and Cloak, their respective scopes of detection are very limited. In comparison 
with more generic detection methods, they are less effective at detecting other types 
of covert timing channels. Berk et al. [13) used a simple mean-max ratio to test for 
bimodal or multimodal distributions that could be induced by binary or multi-symbol 
covert timing channels. 
3.3 Entropy Measures 
In this section, we first describe entropy, conditional entropy, and corrected conditional 
entropy, and then explain how these measures relate to first-order statistics, second 
or higher-order statistics, and the regularity or complexity of a process. Finally, we 
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present the design and implementation of the proposed scheme to detect covert timing 
channels, based on the concept of entropy. 
3.3.1 Entropy and Conditional Entropy 
The entropy rate, which is the average entropy per random variable, can be used as 
a measure of complexity or regularity [101, 105]. The entropy rate is defined as the 
conditional entropy of a sequence of infinite length. The entropy rate is upper-bounded 
by the entropy of the first-order probability density function or first-order entropy. A 
simple independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process has an entropy rate 
equal to the first-order entropy. A highly complex process has a high entropy rate, 
but less than the first-order entropy. A highly regular process has a low entropy rate, 
zero for a rigid periodic process, i.e., a repeated pattern. 
A random process X = {Xi} is defined as an indexed sequence of random variables. 
To give the definition of the entropy rate of a random process, we first define the 
entropy of a sequence of random variables as: 
H(Xl, ... ,Xm)=- L P(xl, ... ,xm)logP(xl, ... ,xm), (3.3) 
X1, ... ,Xm 
where P(xb ... ,xm) is the joint probability P(X1 = x1, ... , Xm = Xm)· 
Then, from the entropy of a sequence of random variables, we define the conditional 
entropy of a random variable given a previous sequence of random variables as: 
46 
Lastly, the entropy rate of a random process is defined as: 
H(X) = lim H(Xm I xl, ... , Xm-l)· 
m-+oo 
(3.5) 
The entropy rate is the conditional entropy of a sequence of infinite length and, 
therefore, cannot be measured for finite samples. Thus, we estimate the entropy rate 
with the conditional entropy of finite samples. It is also important to note that the 
definition of entropy rate is for stationary stochastic processes [27] and the extent 
to which measured data is non-stationary could affect the accuracy of entropy rate 
estimates. 
3.3.2 Corrected Conditional Entropy 
The exact entropy rate cannot be measured for finite samples and must be estimated. 
In practice, we replace probability density functions with empirical probability density 
functions based on the method of histograms. The data is binned in Q bins. The 
specific binning strategy being used is important to the overall effectiveness of the 
test and is discussed in Section 3.3.3. The empirical probability density functions 
are determined by the proportions of patterns in the data, i.e., the proportion of a 
pattern is the probability of that pattern. Here a pattern is defined as a sequence 
of bin numbers. The estimates of the entropy or conditional entropy, based on the 
empirical probability density functions, are represented as: EN and CE, respectively. 
There is a problem with the estimation of CE(Xm I X 1, ... , Xm-l) for some values 
of m. The conditional entropy tends to zero as m increases, due to limited data. If a 
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specific pattern of length m - 1 is found only once in the data, then the extension of 
this pattern to length m will also be found only once. Therefore, the length m pattern 
can be predicted by the length m - 1 pattern, and the length m and m - 1 patterns 
cancel out. If no pattern of length m is repeated in the data, then CE(Xm I Xm-d 
is zero, even for i.i.d. processes. 
To solve the problem of limited data, without fixing the length of m, we use 
the corrected conditional entropy (CCE) [101]. The corrected conditional entropy is 
defined as: 
CCE(Xm I XI, ... , Xm-d = CE(Xm I XI, ... , Xm-d + perc(Xm) · EN(XI), (3.6) 
where perc(Xm) is the percentage of unique patterns of length m and EN(XI) is the 
entropy with m fixed at one, i.e., only the first-order entropy. 
The estimate of the entropy rate is the minimum of the corrected conditional en-
tropy over different values of m. The minimum of the corrected conditional entropy 
is considered to be the best estimate of the entropy rate with the available data. 
The corrected conditional entropy has a minimum, because the conditional entropy 
decreases while the corrective term increases. The corrected conditional entropy has 
been mainly used on biological data, such as electrocardiogram [101] and electroen-
cephalogram data [105]. Although not related to our work, it is interesting to see 
how such a measure can differentiate the states of complex biological processes. For 
example, with the electroencephalogram, an increase in the entropy rate indicates a 
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decrease in the depth of anesthesia, i.e., the subject is becoming more conscious. 
3.3.3 Binning Strategies 
The strategy of binning the data is critical to the overall effectiveness of the test. 
The binning strategy mainly decides: (1) how the data is partitioned and (2) the 
bin granularity or the number of bins Q. In previous work, partitioning data into 
equiprobable bins seems to be most effective [101, 105]. The use of equiprobable bins 
is illustrated in Figure 3.3, showing the partitioning of Exponential data into bins of 
equal area. The bins, numbered 1 through 5, are small in width when the proportion 
of values is high and large in width when the proportion of values is low. Thus, while 
the bins have different widths, the total area of each bin is equal. The bin number for 
a value can then be determined based on the cumulative distribution function: 
bin= lF(x) * QJ, (3.7) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function and x is the value to be binned. 
The bin numbers can also be determined based on ranges, e.g., 0.0 < bin1 :::; 0.22, 
0.22 < bin2 :::; 0.51, 0.51 < bin3 :::; 0.91, and so on, which requires a search of the 
ranges to determine the correct bin number for a value. Meanwhile, the cumula-
tive distribution function can determine the correct bin in constant time, which is 
important for performance when the number of bins is large. 
The choice of the number of bins offers a tradeoff. While a larger number of bins 
retains more information about the distribution of the data, it increases the number 
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Figure 3.3: Equiprobable Binning of Exponential Data 
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of possible patterns Qm and, thus, limits the ability of the test to recognize longer 
patterns due to the limited data. In contrast, a small number of bins captures less 
information about the distribution, but is better able to measure the regularity of the 
data. Therefore, as both strategies have advantages and disadvantages, we use both 
coarse-grain and fine-grain binning. 
To determine the best choice of Q for coarse-grain binning, we run tests on cor-
related and uncorrelated samples for Q = 2 through 10. The correlated samples are 
100 traces of 2,000 HTTP inter-packet delays. The uncorrelated samples are random 
permutations of the correlated samples. We then count the number of uncorrelated 
samples with scores that overlap with the scores of correlated samples. There is no 
overlap for the values of Q = 5 to 8. Therefore, to retain the ability of the test 
to recognize longer patterns and measure regularity, we use Q = 5 for coarse-grain 
binning. 
It is much simpler to determine the best choice of Q for fine-grain binning. With 
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increasing values of Q, the number of possible patterns Qm becomes much larger than 
the size of the sample being tested. At this point, the test scores are dominated by 
the estimate of the entropy for length one. Then, as we increase the value of Q, the 
bins continue to become more precise, leading to a better estimate of the entropy for 
length one than that for smaller values of Q. Therefore, as Q can be made arbitrarily 
precise, we use Q = 216 = 65,536 for fine-grain binning. 
3.3.4 Implementation Details 
Our design goal is to be effective in detection and efficient in terms of run-time and 
storage. The efficiency of tests is particularly important if tests are conducted in 
real-time for online processing of data. Thus, we are careful to optimize our imple-
mentation for performance. We implement the corrected conditional entropy in the 
C programming language. The patterns are represented as nodes in a Q-ary tree of 
height m. The nodes of the tree include pattern counts and links to the nodes with 
longer patterns. The level of the tree corresponds to the length of patterns. The 
children of the root are the patterns of length 1. The leaf nodes are the patterns of 
length m. 
To add a new pattern of length m to the tree, we move down the tree towards 
the leaves, updating the counts of the intermediate nodes and creating new nodes. 
Thus, when we reach the bottom of the tree, we have counted both the new pattern 
and all of its sub-patterns. After all patterns of length m are added, we perform a 
breadth-first traversal. The breadth-first traversal computes the corrected conditional 
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entropy at each level and terminates when the minimum is obtained. If the breadth-
first traversal reaches the bottom of the tree without having the minimum, then we 
must increase m and continue. 
The time and space complexities are O(n · m), where n is the size of the sample, if 
we assume a priori knowledge of the distribution and use the cumulative distribution 
function to determine the correct bin for each value in constant time. Otherwise, the 
time complexity increases to O(n · m ·log(Q)). In practice, running our program on 
a sample of size 2,000 with Q = 5 and a pattern of length 10 on our test machine, 
an Intel Pentium D 3.4Ghz, takes 16 milliseconds. However, small changes in the 
implementation can have significant impact on performance. 
To demonstrate this, we evaluate the computation overhead of our implementation 
and that of a previous implementation [105]. The computation time of both imple-
mentations with increasing pattern length is shown in Figure 3.4. For small values 
of m, our computation time is slightly longer, because of the overhead of creating 
our data structure. However, as m increases, the previous implementation increases 
quadratically, whereas our implementation increases linearly. The quadratic growth 
is caused by the separate processing of patterns of different lengths, i.e., the patterns 
of length 1, then the patterns of length 2, and so on, which introduces a quadratic 
term due to the summation of the pattern lengths: 2:::~ 1 i = m2;{m. 
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Figure 3.4: CCE Performance 
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3.4 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we validate the effectiveness of our proposed approach through a 
series of experiments. The focus of these experiments is to determine if our entropy-
based methods (entropy and corrected conditional entropy) are able to detect covert 
timing channels. We test our entropy-based methods against four covert timing chan-
nels: IPCTC [19], TRCTC [18], MBCTC [45] and JitterBug [110]. Furthermore, we 
compare our entropy-based methods to two other detection tests: the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and the regularity test [19]. 
The purpose of a detection test is to differentiate covert traffic from legitimate 
traffic. The performance of a detection test can be measured based on false positive 
and true positive rates, with low false positive rate and high true positive rate being 
ideal. In practice, because of the large variation in legitimate network traffic, it is 
important that tests work well for typical traffic and occasional outliers. If a detection 
test gives test scores with significant overlap between legitimate and covert samples, 
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then it fails on detection. Therefore, the mean, variance, and distribution of test 
scores are critical metrics to the performance of a detection test. 
3.4.1 Experimental Setup 
The defensive perimeter of a network, made up of firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems, is designed to protect the network from malicious traffic. Typically, only a few 
specific application protocols, such as HTTP and SMTP, although heavily monitored, 
are allowed to pass through the defensive perimeter. In addition, other protocols, 
such as SSH, might be permitted to cross the perimeter but only to specific trusted 
destinations. 
We now consider the scenarios discussed in Section 3.2. In the first scenario, which 
relates to IPCTC, TRCTC and MBCTC, a compromised machine uses a covert timing 
channel to communicate with a machine outside the network. For IPCTC, TRCTC 
and MBCTC, we utilize outgoing HTTP inter-packet delays as the medium, due to 
the wide acceptance of HTTP for crossing the network perimeter and the high volume 
of HTTP traffic. In the second scenario, which relates to JitterBug, a compromised 
input device uses a covert timing channel to leak typed information over the traffic of 
a networked application. For JitterBug, we utilize outgoing SSH inter-packet delays 
as the medium, based on the original design [110] and the high volume of keystrokes 
in interactive network applications. 
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3.4.1.1 Dataset 
The covert and legitimate samples that we use for our experiments are from two 
datasets: (1) HTTP traces we collected on a medium-size campus network and (2) a 
dataset obtained from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC). In total, 
we have 12GB of tcpdump packet header traces (HTTP protocol) that we collected 
and 79GB of tcpdump packet header traces (all protocols) from the UNC dataset [?]. 
In our experiments, we use several subsets of the two datasets, including: 
• HTTP training set: 200,000 HTTP packets 
• HTTP test set: 200,000 HTTP packets 
• TRCTC test set: 200,000 HTTP packets 
• MBCTC test set: 200,000 HTTP packets 
• SSH training set: 200,000 SSH packets 
• SSH test set: 200,000 HTTP packets 
• JitterBug test set: 200,000 SSH packets 
The packets in each dataset are grouped into flows. The flows represent outgoing 
traffic from a host to a specific port, e.g., port 80 for HTTP or port 22 for SSH. The 
flows are based on a 3-tuple of source host, destination port, and protocol, rather 
than a 5-tuple of source address, source port, destination address, destination port, 
and protocol. The subsets contain 100 samples and each sample has 2,000 packets 
from a flow. 
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In our experiments, we test a number of covert samples, which are generated from 
these subsets and from the encoding methods for IPCTC, TRCTC, MBCTC, and 
JitterBug. The covert timing channels are configured with the recommended settings 
from their original works, and we use the most advanced version if multiple versions of 
a covert timing channel are available. Specifically, IPCTC rotates the timing-interval 
t amongst 40ms, 60ms and 80ms; TRCTC is the BMC type; and JitterBug subtracts 
the random sequence si before the modulo operation. The input messages transmitted 
in our tests are random bits generated by a pseudo-random number generator. For 
TRCTC, we generate the covert samples from a set of 200,000 legitimate HTTP 
inter-packet delays. For MBCTC, we generate the covert samples from a model that 
is selected by fitting multiple models to a set of 200,000 legitimate HTTP inter-packet 
delays. For JitterBug, we generate the covert samples from a set of 200,000 legitimate 
SSH inter-packet delays. A test machine replays the set of 200,000 SSH inter-packet 
delays and adds JitterBug delays. Note that our version of JitterBug is implemented 
in software. A monitoring machine on the campus backbone then collects a trace 
of the JitterBug traffic, which adds network delays after the addition of JitterBug 
delays. Since the monitoring machine is only four hops away from the test machine, 
with a RTT of 0.3ms, the added network delays are small. This JitterBug scenario is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2, where a defensive perimeter monitors outgoing traffic. 
The training sets of legitimate traffic are useful for some of the detection tests. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test uses the training sets to represent the behavior of legitimate 
traffic. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test then measures the distance between the test 
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sample and the training set. The entropy and corrected conditional entropy tests use 
the training sets to determine the range of each bin, based on equiprobable binning. 
These tests do not require a priori binning, but doing so improves performance, as 
the data does not need to be partitioned online. 
3.4.1.2 Detection Methodology 
In our experiments, we run detection tests on samples of covert and legitimate traffic. 
We use the resulting test scores to determine if a sample is covert or legitimate as 
follows. First, we set the targeted false positive rate at 0.01. To achieve this false 
positive rate, the cutoff scores-the scores that decide whether a sample is legitimate 
or covert-are set at the 99th or 1st percentile (high scores or low scores for differ-
ent tests) of legitimate sample scores from the HTTP or SSH training set. Then, 
samples with scores worse than the cutoff are identified as covert, while samples with 
scores better than the cutoff are identified as legitimate. The false positive rate is the 
proportion of legitimate samples in the test set that are wrongly identified as covert, 
while the true positive rate is the proportion of covert samples in the test set that are 
correctly identified as covert. 
Considering the properties of the detection tests, we can classify them as tests of 
shape or regularity. The shape of traffic is described by first-order statistics, and the 
regularity of traffic is described by second or higher-order statistics. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and entropy test are tests of shape, while the regularity test and corrected 
conditional entropy test are tests of regularity. The test scores are interpreted as 
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follows. 
In the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we measure the distance between the test sample 
and the training set that represents legitimate behavior. Thus, if the test score is small, 
it implies that the sample is close to the normal behavior. However, if the sample does 
not fit the normal behavior well, the test score will be large, indicating the possible 
occurrence of a covert timing channel. By contrast, in the regularity test, we measure 
the standard deviation of the normalized standard deviations of sets of 100 packets. 
If the regularity score is low, then the sample is highly regular, indicating the possible 
existence of a covert timing channel. 
The entropy test estimates the first-order entropy, whereas the corrected condi-
tional entropy test estimates the higher-order entropy. The entropy test is based on 
the same algorithm as the corrected conditional entropy test, except that the correc-
tive term is not added. The corrected conditional entropy test uses Q = 5, whereas 
the entropy test uses Q = 65, 536 and m fixed at one. If the entropy test score is 
low, it suggests a possible covert timing channel, because the sample does not fit the 
appropriate distribution. If the conditional entropy test score is lower or higher than 
the cutoff scores, it suggests a possible covert timing channel. When the conditional 
entropy test score is low, the sample is highly regular. When the conditional entropy 
test score is high, near the first-order entropy, the sample shows a lack of correlations. 
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3.4.2 Experimental Results 
In the following, we present our experimental results in detail. The four detection 
tests are: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, regularity test, entropy test, and corrected 
conditional entropy test. The four covert timing channels are: IPCTC, TRCTC, 
MBCTC, and JitterBug. The experiments are organized by covert timing channels, 
which are ordered in terms of increasing detection difficulty. 
3.4.2.1 IPCTC 
Our first set of experiments investigates how the detection tests perform against 
IPCTC [19]. IPCTC is the simplest among the three covert timing channels be-
ing tested and the easiest to detect, because it exhibits abnormality in both shape 
and regularity. The abnormal shape of IPCTC is caused by the encoding scheme. 
The encoding scheme encodes a 1-bit by transmitting a packet during an interval, and 
encodes a O-bit with no packet transmission. Thus, the number of O-bits between two 
1-bits determines the inter-packet delays. If the bit sequence is random, then we can 
view the bit sequence as a series of Bernoulli trials and, thus, the inter-packet delays 
approximate a Geometric distribution. The timing-interval tis rotated among 40 mil-
liseconds, 60 milliseconds, and 80 milliseconds after each 100 packets, as suggested 
by Cabuk et al. [19], to avoid creating a regular pattern of inter-packet delays at 
multiples of a single t. However, this instead creates a regular pattern of inter-packet 
delays at multiples of 20 milliseconds. The regularity of IPCTC is due to the lack of 
significant correlations between inter-packet delays. That is, the inter-packet delays 
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are determined by the bit sequence being encoded, not by the previous inter-packet 
delays. 
We run each detection test 100 times for 2,000 packet samples of both legitimate 
traffic and IPCTC traffic. The mean and standard deviation of the test scores are 
shown in Table 3.1. The detection tests all achieve lower average scores for IPCTC 
than those for legitimate traffic. The regularity test has a very high standard deviation 
for legitimate traffic, which suggests that this test is sensitive to variations in the 
behavior of legitimate traffic. The corrected conditional entropy test has a mean 
score for covert traffic that appears somewhat close to that of legitimate traffic, 1.96 
for legitimate and 2.21 for covert. However, in relative terms, these scores are not 
that close, since the standard deviation of the corrected conditional entropy test is 
relatively low. The mean score for IPCTC is much closer to the maximum entropy 
than to the mean score of legitimate traffic. The maximum entropy is the most uniform 
possible distribution [27]. The maximum entropy for Q = 5 is: 
H(X) = Q ·~log(~)= 5 ·~log(~)~ 2.3219 (3.8) 
The corrected conditional entropy score is bounded from above by the first-order 
entropy. The first-order entropy is then bounded from above by the maximum entropy. 
Therefore, the corrected conditional entropy scores for IPCTC are close to the highest 
values possible. 
As shown in Table 3.2, the detection rates for IPCTC (i.e. true positive rates for 
detecting IPCTC) are 1.0 for all tests except the regularity test, whose detection rate 
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is only 0.54. The regularity test measures sets of 100 packets and the timing-interval 
t is rotated after each set of 100 packets, so the regularity test observes three distinct 
variances and accurately measures the regularity of IPCTC. The problem though is not 
measuring IPCTC, but measuring legitimate traffic. The very high standard deviation 
of the regularity test against legitimate traffic makes it impossible to differentiate 
IPCTC from legitimate samples without a higher false positive rate. Moreover, if we 
increase the timing-interval t to greater than 100 packets, the regularity test observes a 
different number of packets for each t value within each window, as the sets oft packets 
overlap with the window at different points, making the test less reliable. However, 
if we decrease the timing-interval t to much less than 100 packets, the regularity test 
observes a similar number of packets for each t value within each window and the 
variance for each window is similar, which makes the test more reliable. 
Still, the main problem with the regularity test is its high standard deviation for 
legitimate traffic. The regularity test is very sensitive to outliers in legitimate traffic. 
For example, if O"i is very small, due to a sequence of similar inter-packet delays, 
and O"j is average or larger, then lu;;;uil is very large, especially for the values of O"i 
close to zero, which are not uncommon. In fact, one such outlier in a sample is more 
than sufficient to make a covert sample appear to be a legitimate sample. The high 
variance of the regularity test demonstrates that it is important to examine more than 
the average test score, since the variance and distribution of test scores are critical to 
the successful detection of covert timing channels. 
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Table 3 1· IPCTC Test Scores ..
HTTP-TEST IPCTC 
test mean stdev mean stdev 
KSTEST 0.180 0.077 0.708 0.000 
regularity 35.726 36.635 0.330 0.056 
EN 10.454 0.152 6.250 0.028 
CCE 1.964 0.149 2.216 0.013 
Table 3 2· IPCTC Detection Rates ..
HTTP-TEST IPCTC 
test false positive true positive 
KSTEST ~ 0.36 .00 1.00 
regularity ~ 0.41 .01 .54 
EN~ 8.56 .01 1.00 
CCE ~ 2.16 .01 1.00 
3.4.2.2 TRCTC 
Our second set of experiments investigates how our detection tests perform against 
TRCTC [18]. TRCTC is a more advanced covert timing channel that makes use of a 
replay attack. TRCTC replays a set of legitimate inter-packet delays to approximate 
the behavior of legitimate traffic. Thus, TRCTC has approximately the same shape 
as legitimate traffic, but exhibits abnormal regularity, like IPCTC. The regularity 
of TRCTC, like IPCTC, is due to the lack of significant correlations between inter-
packet delays. Although TRCTC replays inter-packet delays, the replay is in random 
order, as determined by the bit sequence that is being encoded, thus breaking the 
correlations in the original inter-packet delays. 
We run each detection test 100 times for 2,000 packet samples of both legitimate 
traffic and TRCTC traffic. The mean and standard deviation of the test scores are 
shown in Table 3.3. The test scores for TRCTC and legitimate traffic are approx-
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imately equal for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and entropy tests. These tests strictly 
measure first-order statistics, and, as such, are not able to detect TRCTC. The reg-
ularity test achieves a much lower average score for TRCTC than that for legitimate 
traffic, which is due to the similar variance between groups of packets in TRCTC. 
However, the standard deviation of the regularity test is again very high for legiti-
mate traffic and, this time, is high for covert traffic as well. At the same time, the 
corrected conditional entropy test gives similar results to those for IPCTC. The cor-
rected conditional entropy test has a mean score for TRCTC that appears somewhat 
close to that of legitimate, 1.96 for legitimate and 2.21 for covert. However, if we ex-
amine the distribution of test scores for TRCTC and legitimate traffic, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.5, then we can see that, although some scores are in adjacent bins, there 
is no overlap between the distributions. Furthermore, the distribution of legitimate 
test scores is strongly skewed to the left, away from the distribution of TRCTC test 
scores. The detection rates for TRCTC, as shown in Table 3.4, are very low (0.04 or 
less) for all the detection tests except the corrected conditional entropy test, which 
has a detection rate of 1.0. The corrected conditional entropy test scores of TRCTC 
are again close to the maximum entropy, therefore the corrected conditional entropy 
test is successful in detecting TRCTC. 
Table 3 3· TRCTC Test Scores ..
HTTP-TEST TRCTC 
test mean stdev mean stdev 
KSTEST 0.180 0.077 0.180 0.077 
regularity 35.726 36.635 7.845 9.324 
EN 10.454 0.152 10.454 0.152 
CCE 1.964 0.149 2.217 0.012 
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Table 3 4· TRCTC Detection Rates • 0 
HTTP-TEST TRCTC 
test false positive true positive 
KSTEST ~ 0.36 .00 .01 
regularity :::; 0.41 .01 .04 
EN :S 8.56 .01 .02 
CCE ~ 2.16 .01 1.00 
Figure 3.5: Distribution of CCE Test Scores for TRCTC 
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Our third set of experiments investigates how our detection tests perform against 
MBCTC [45]. MBCTC is a more advanced covert timing channel that exploits traffic 
modeling to mimic legitimate traffic. The traffic model is determined by using maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (MLE) to determine model parameters and then selecting 
the model with the lowest root mean squared error (RMSE) from several models. The 
model selected for legitimate HTTP traffic is Weibull with a mean scale parameter .\ 
of 0.125 and a mean shape parameter k of 0.426. With these parameters, the mean 
inter-packet delay is 0.3524, approximately 3 packets per second. The model is then 
refitted in sets of 100 packets to better model changes in the traffic over time. Thus, 
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MBCTC has a similar shape to legitimate traffic, due to modeling the distribution, 
and a similar regularity for sets of 100 packets or more, due to the refitting process. 
We run each detection test 100 times for 2,000 packet samples of both legitimate 
traffic and MBCTC traffic. The mean and standard deviation of the test scores are 
shown in Table 3.5. The test scores of MBCTC are higher than those of legitimate 
traffic for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, though less than the standard deviation, due 
to the model being very close but not a perfect fit. The regularity test achieves a 
lower average score for MBCTC than that of legitimate traffic, though the standard 
deviation is again very high for legitimate traffic and covert traffic. The entropy test 
scores of MBCTC are higher on average than those of legitimate traffic, indicating that 
MBCTC traffic is consistently a somewhat close fit to the legitimate traffic distribu-
tion. The corrected conditional entropy test scores are significantly lower for MBCTC 
than for legitimate traffic. However, when we examine the distribution of test scores 
for MBCTC and legitimate traffic, as illustrated in Figure 3.6, we can see that there 
is a slight overlap between the distributions. This shows that the refitting process 
used by MBCTC, i.e., changing the model after each set of 100 packets, is relatively 
successful, but not sufficient to capture the true regularity of legitimate traffic. In 
particular, MBCTC traffic is more regular over time than legitimate traffic, i.e., the 
sequences of inter-packet delays are more predictable. For example, if a burst occurs, 
then the expected value of the model will be small and MBCTC will generate a larger 
portion of small inter-packet delays for the next 100 inter-packet delays. As a result, 
small inter-packet delays will be more likely to be followed by small inter-packet de-
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lays in MBCTC traffic than in legitimate traffic, which results in lower scores for the 
corrected conditional entropy test. The detection rates of MBCTC, as shown in Table 
3.4, are very low (0.04 or less) for all the detection tests except the entropy test and 
the corrected conditional entropy test. The entropy test is able to sometimes detect 
MBCTC, with a detection rate of 0.55. The corrected conditional entropy test is very 
successful in detecting MBCTC, with a detection rate of 0.95. 
Table 3 5· MBCTC Test Scores ..
HTTP-TEST MBCTC 
test mean stdev mean stdev 
KSTEST 0.180 0.077 0.208 0.073 
regularity 35.726 36.635 18.440 22.605 
EN 10.454 0.152 10.739 0.078 
CCE 1.964 0.149 1.156 0.223 
Table 3 6· MBCTC Detection Rates ..
HTTP-TEST MBCTC 
test false positive true positive 
KSTEST ?': 0.36 .00 .03 
regularity ~ 0.41 .01 .02 
EN?': 10.74 .01 .55 
CCE ~ 1.50 .00 .95 
3.4.2.4 JitterBug 
Our fourth set of experiments investigates how our detection tests perform against 
JitterBug [110]. JitterBug is a passive covert timing channel, so no additional traffic 
is generated to transmit information. Instead, JitterBug manipulates the inter-packet 
delays of existing legitimate traffic. The timing-window w, which determines the 
maximum delay that JitterBug adds, is set at 20 milliseconds, as suggested by Shah 
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of CCE Test Scores for MBCTC 
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et al. [110]. The average inter-packet delay of the original SSH traffic is 1.264 seconds, 
whereas, with JitterBug, the average inter-packet delay is 1.274 seconds. In addition, 
while 10 milliseconds on average might be noticeable with other protocols, SSH traffic 
has a small proportion of short inter-packet delays, i.e., only about 20% of inter-packet 
delays are less than 30ms in the training set. Therefore, because of having legitimate 
traffic as a base and only slightly increasing the inter-packet delays, JitterBug is able 
to retain much of the original correlation from the legitimate traffic. Moreover, by 
slightly increasing the inter-packet delays, JitterBug only slightly affects the original 
shape. Thus, JitterBug has similar shape and regularity to legitimate traffic. 
Also JitterBug is very difficult to detect for several other reasons. From a practical 
perspective, the machine itself has not been compromised, so conventional host-based 
intrusion detection methods fail. Moreover, the traffic is encrypted, so the contents 
of the packets cannot be used to predict the appropriate behavior. Additionally, the 
position of JitterBug, between the machine and the human, further complicates detec-
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tion because of the variation in human behavior, i.e., different typing characteristics. 
However, as JitterBug is a covert timing channel and transmits information, there is 
some affect on the entropy of the original process. 
We run each detection test 100 times for 2,000 packet samples of both legitimate 
traffic and JitterBug traffic. The mean and standard deviation of the test scores are 
shown in Table 3.7. The test scores for JitterBug and legitimate traffic are close to 
each other for all the tests except the entropy test. If we examine the distribution 
of entropy test scores for JitterBug and legitimate traffics, as illustrated in Figure 
3.5, we can see that the distributions of JitterBug and legitimate test scores are quite 
distinct. The detection rates for JitterBug shown in Table 3.8, are very low (0.04 or 
less) for all the detection tests except the entropy test, which has a detection rate 
of 1.0. Note that the other tests do detect some difference between JitterBug and 
legitimate traffic, but the differences are so small that it is impossible for these tests 
to differentiate JitterBug from legitimate traffic without a much higher false positive 
rate. Although the corrected conditional entropy test is successful at detecting all 
the other covert timing channels, it is unable to detect JitterBug. The corrected 
conditional entropy test bins the data into Q = 5 bins. For SSH traffic, the typical bin 
ranges (based on equiprobable binning) are 0.0 < bin1 ::::; 0.032, 0.032 < bin2 ::::; 0.088, 
0.088 < bin3 ::::; 0.160, 0.160 < bin4 ::::; 0.305, and 0.305 < bin5. JitterBug adds a 
maximum of 20ms (lOms on average) to the inter-packet delays, so the bin numbers for 
inter-packet delays are rarely changed. Therefore, the corrected conditional entropy 
scores of JitterBug traffic are close to those of the original legitimate SSH traffic. In 
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short, the corrected conditional entropy test is simply insensitive to small changes in 
the distribution. 
In contrast, the entropy test is able to detect JitterBug. The entropy test uses a 
large number of bins, with bin widths determined by the distribution of legitimate traf-
fic. The entropy test measures how uniformly the inter-packet delays are distributed 
into the bins, and how uniformly the inter-packet delays fit the legitimate traffic dis-
tribution. JitterBug creates small changes throughout the distribution. Since these 
changes fall within the variance that is typical of legitimate traffic, the tests that 
measure the maximum distance, like the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, fail to detect the 
changes. However, the entropy test is sensitive to such changes throughout the distri-
bution. JitterBug increases the inter-packet delays and, due to the rotating window, 
redistributes the inter-packet delays in an Equilikely distribution. However, the in-
creases do not follow the legitimate distribution, leading to slight increases or decreases 
in the proportion of inter-packet delays for different bins. The entropy test measures 
how evenly the inter-packet delays are distributed into the bins, with the legitimate 
traffic distribution resulting in the most even or uniform distribution of bins and the 
most entropy, since the bins are sized to be equiprobable for the legitimate distribu-
tion. Therefore, the entropy test score for JitterBug is lower than that for legitimate 
traffic, which can be easily detected. 
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Table 3. 7: JitterBug Test Scores 
SSH-TEST JitterBug 
test mean stdev mean stdev 
KSTEST .270 .133 .273 .123 
regularity 6.230 5.847 6.038 5.624 
EN 10.663 0.374 8.199 0.720 
CCE 1.779 0.261 1.837 0.220 
Table 3.8: JitterBug Detection Rates 
SSH-TEST JitterBug 
test false positive true positive 
KSTEST 2: 0.60 .02 .03 
regularity :::; 0.15 .03 .03 
EN:::; 8.84 .01 1.00 
CCE 2: 2.16 .01 .04 
3.4.2.5 All Channels - Variable Sample Size 
Our last set of experiments investigates how our detection tests perform with different 
sample sizes against all four covert timing channels, IPCTC, TRCTC, MBCTC, and 
JitterBug. We vary sample sizes from 500 to 2,000 inter-packet delays for the entropy 
test and the corrected conditional entropy test. The sample size is important because 
it determines the amount of time it takes to detect a covert timing channel, and 
thus, the amount of information that a covert timing channel can transmit before it 
is detected. Of course, the faster a covert timing channel can be detected, the less 
information it can transmit. However, there is a tradeoff between detection speed and 
detection accuracy. While a smaller sample size means faster detection, it tends to be 
less accurate compared to larger sample sizes. 
The true positive rates for the entropy test against IPCTC, TRCTC, MBCTC, 
and JitterBug with 500 to 2,000 inter-packet delays are shown in Figure 3.8. The 
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Figure 3. 7: Distribution of EN Test Scores for JitterBug 
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true positive rates degrade at different rates in different covert timing channels. On 
one extreme, for IPCTC there is no decrease in true positive rate and it is easily 
detected with as little as 500 inter-packet delays. The pattern of IPCTC is obvious, 
so there is no need for a large amount of data. On the other extreme, the true positive 
rates of JitterBug degrade more rapidly with the decrease of sample size, and it is 
difficult to detect JitterBug with less than 1,600 inter-packet delays. JitterBug is more 
subtle. It adds only small delays and has a relatively low capacity, so its inter-packet 
delays are indistinguishable from normal without more traffic. In the middle, the true 
positive rates of MBCTC degrade gradually with the decrease of sample size, starting 
at 0.55 and ending at 0.14, showing approximately a linear relationship between its 
true positive rate and its sample size. Lastly, TRCTC is not detected by the entropy 
test, so its true positive rates remain close to zero. 
The true positive rates for the corrected conditional entropy test against IPCTC, 
TRCTC, MBCTC, and Jitterbug with 500 to 2,000 inter-packet delays are shown in 
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Figure 3.9. IPCTC and TRCTC demonstrate a similar trend in their true positive 
rates. Both have true positive rates close to 1.0 with more than 700 inter-packet delays 
and then degrade quickly with the decrease of sample size. As neither covert timing 
channel attempts to capture inter-dependencies between inter-packet delays, this likely 
indicates that the minimum sample size required by the corrected conditional entropy 
test for accurate detection is around 700. The true positive rates of MBCTC again 
decline gradually with the decrease of sample size, starting at 0.95 and ending at 0.27, 
similar to the corresponding entropy test results. JitterBug is not detected by the 
corrected conditional entropy test, so its true positive rates are close to zero for all 
sample sizes. 
Overall, combining the results of both tests, we can see that IPCTC and TRCTC 
are easier to be detected than MBCTC and Jitterbug when sample size is small. 
IPCTC and TRCTC can be accurately detected at the true positive rates of 1.0, 
with as little as 500 inter-packet delays and 1,000 inter-packet delays, respectively. 
MBCTC and JitterBug are much more difficult to detect, and they require close to 
2,000 inter-packet delays or more for accurate detection. These results are attributed 
to the fact that MBCTC and JitterBug effectively capture both traffic shape and traffic 
regularity, while TRCTC only captures traffic shape and IPCTC captures neither of 
these two properties. 
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3.4.3 Discussion 
The detection tests that we present are all able to detect some covert timing chan-
nels under certain conditions. However, the previous methods fail for detecting most 
of the tested covert timing channels. One major reason lies in the high variation of 
legitimate traffic. For example, the regularity test exhibits obvious weakness in this 
regard. Interestingly, the regularity test is the only test, other than the corrected 
conditional entropy test, that achieves lower average scores for all the covert tim-
ing channels. However, due to the high standard deviation of the regularity test in 
measuring legitimate traffic, the regularity test is not an effective detection method. 
The other main reason lies in the properties of covert traffic. For example, while the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is better able to deal with legitimate traffic variation, it has 
problems with covert timing channels whose distribution is very close to that of legiti-
mate traffic. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test measures the maximum distance between 
the two distributions, rather than measuring differences throughout the distribution. 
Thus, when the distribution of covert traffic is very close to that of legitimate traffic, 
the variance of the test scores is sufficiently large so that the test cannot differentiate 
covert traffic from legitimate traffic. 
Our entropy-based approach proves more effective than previous schemes. Based 
on the advantages of different binning strategies, we make use of both entropy and 
corrected conditional entropy for detecting covert timing channels. The entropy test 
is sensitive to small changes throughout the distribution. However, for a covert timing 
channel whose distribution is nearly identical to that of legitimate traffic, the entropy 
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test fails. By contrast, the corrected conditional entropy test measures the regularity 
or complexity of the traffic, rather than the distribution. Thus, it is effective to 
detect such a covert timing channel. However, if the original correlations of traffic are 
retained and the distribution is changed, then the conditional entropy test fails; but 
the entropy test works in this scenario by detecting slight changes in the distribution. 
Therefore, when both tests are combined, our entropy-based approach is effective in 
detecting all the tested covert timing channels. 
Figure 3.8: EN True Positive Rate vs. Sample Size 
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3.5 Potential Countermeasures 
In this section, we discuss possible countermeasures that could be used to harden 
covert timing channels against our entropy-based approach. Our discussion focuses on 
TRCTC, MBCTC and JitterBug. TRCTC and MBCTC are detected by the corrected 
conditional entropy test and JitterBug is detected by the entropy test. 
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Figure 3.9: CCE True Positive Rate vs. Sample Size 
0.8 
~ 
~ 0.6 
0 
a. 
Q) E oA 
0.2 ·--
.. 
..•. 
..... -· 
...... -
..... 
IPCTC-
TRCTC 
MBCTC •·· 
JitterBug · v 
0 L-~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
400 600 800 1 000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 
sample size 
In an attempt to evade the corrected conditional entropy test, TRCTC could be 
redesigned to replay longer correlated sequences of inter-packet delays. The corrected 
conditional entropy test could counter this technique for short sequences by increasing 
the minimum pattern length. Of course, with increasing sequence length, the corrected 
conditional entropy test would lose its capability to measure regularity, because of the 
issues discussed in Section 3.3, unless the sample size were increased. However, this 
is not a significant threat, because replaying long correlated sequences of inter-packet 
delays would greatly reduce the capacity of TRCTC. In an attempt to evade the 
corrected conditional entropy test, MBCTC could be changed to refit the model more 
frequently so as to better capture the regularity of traffic. Moreover, MBCTC could 
be redesigned to model conditional distributions to better capture inter-dependencies 
in traffic. 
In an attempt to evade the entropy test, JitterBug could be reconfigured to use a 
smaller timing-window w. Eventually, as w becomes smaller, the entropy test would 
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need a larger sample size to detect the JitterBug. However, using a smaller timing-
window would, similar to our discussion of TRCTC, reduce the capacity of JitterBug. 
Additionally, JitterBug could be changed to transmit packets at more precise timing 
than milliseconds, as the millisecond-level precision could create a detectable pattern 
when the network delays are small. As another alternative, since a large number of 
inter-packet delays are required to detect JitterBug, JitterBug could attempt to trans-
mit with fewer inter-packet delays than the minimum required for the entropy test. 
However, there is a problem with this approach. JitterBug uses forward error correc-
tion with repeated transmissions. This mechanism provides reliable communication 
even if packets are lost or some of the perturbed keystrokes go to a non-network appli-
cation, neither of which can be detected by a JitterBug embedded in the keyboard. By 
reducing the number of repetitions, JitterBug could evade detection, but could also 
fail to deliver its message. It remains an open question whether these countermeasures 
would be practical. 
3.6 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this chapter, we introduced an entropy-based technique to detect covert-timing 
channels by employing both entropy and corrected conditional entropy. We designed 
and implemented the proposed entropy-based detection tool. The development of 
this tool addresses a number of non-trivial design issues, including efficient use of 
data structures, data partition, bin granularity, and pattern length. We observed 
that as bin granularity increases, entropy estimates become more precise, whereas 
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corrected conditional entropy estimates become less precise. Therefore, based on this 
observation, we utilized the fine-binned entropy estimation and the coarse-binned 
corrected conditional entropy estimation for covert timing channel detection. 
We then applied our entropy-based techniques for detecting covert timing channels. 
The corrected conditional entropy test is able to detect the covert timing channels with 
abnormal regularity, while the entropy test is able to detect the covert timing channels 
with abnormal shape. Our experimental results show that the combination of entropy 
and corrected conditional entropy is capable of detecting a variety of covert timing 
channels. In contrast, for a covert timing channel whose distribution is close to that 
of legitimate traffic, all the previous detection methods fail. 
There are a number of possible directions for our future work. We plan to fur-
ther investigate the possible countermeasures that could be used by attackers to evade 
entropy-based detection. We also plan to explore the connection between our entropy-
based detection methods and the entropy that relates to covert timing channel capac-
ity. We believe that the exploration could lead to better detection methods or lower 
overall bounds on the capacity of covert timing channels. 
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Chapter 4 
Measurement and Classification 
of Chat Bots 
Internet chat is a popular application that enables real-time text-based communica-
tion. Millions of people around the world use Internet chat to exchange messages and 
discuss a broad range of topics on-line. Internet chat is also a unique networked appli-
cation, because of its human-to-human interaction and low bandwidth consumption 
[32]. However, the large user base and open nature of Internet chat make it an ideal 
target for malicious exploitation. 
The abuse of chat services by automated programs, known as chat bats, poses 
a serious threat to on-line users. Chat bots have been found on a number of chat 
systems, including commercial chat networks, such as AOL [99, 56], Yahoo! [98, 68, 
112, 85, 84] and MSN [57), and open chat networks, such as IRC and Jabber. There 
are also reports of bots in some non-chat systems with chat features, including online 
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games, such as World of Warcraft [28, 107] and Second Life [93]. Chat bots exploit 
these on-line systems to send spam, spread malware, and mount phishing attacks. 
So far, the efforts to combat chat bots have focused on two different approaches: 
(1) keyword-based filtering and (2) human interactive proofs. The keyword-based 
message filters, used by third party chat clients [131, 134], suffer from high false 
negative rates because bot makers frequently update chat bots to evade published 
keyword lists. The use of human interactive proofs, such as CAPTCHAs [3], is also 
ineffective because bot operators assist chat bots in passing the tests to log into chat 
rooms [85, 84]. In August 2007, Yahoo! implemented CAPTCHA to block bots from 
entering chat rooms, but bots are still able to enter chat rooms in large numbers. 
There are online petitions against both AOL and Yahoo! [99, 98], requesting that the 
chat service providers address the growing bot problem. While on-line systems are 
besieged with chat bots, no systematic investigation on chat bots has been conducted. 
The effective detection system against chat bots is in great demand but still missing. 
In the chapter, we first perform a series of measurements on a large commercial 
chat network, Yahoo! chat, to study the behaviors of chat bots and humans in on-line 
chat systems. Our measurements capture a total of 14 different types of chat bots. The 
different types of chat bots use different triggering mechanisms and text obfuscation 
techniques. The former determines message timing, and the latter determines message 
content. Our measurements also reveal that human behavior is more complex than 
bot behavior, which motivates the use of entropy rate, a measure of complexity, for 
chat bot classification. Based on the measurement study, we propose a classification 
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system to accurately distinguish chat hots from humans. There are two main compo-
nents in our classification system: (1) an entropy classifier and (2) a machine-learning 
classifier. Based on the characteristics of message time and size, the entropy classifier 
measures the complexity of chat flows and then classifies them as bots or humans. 
In contrast, the machine-learning classifier is mainly based on message content for 
detection. The two classifiers complement each other in chat bot detection. While the 
entropy classifier requires more messages for detection and, thus, is slower, it is more 
accurate to detect unknown chat bots. Moreover, the entropy classifier helps train the 
machine-learning classifier. The machine learning classifier requires less messages for 
detection and, thus, is faster, but cannot detect most unknown hots. By combining 
the entropy classifier and the machine-learning classifier, the proposed classification 
system is highly effective to capture chat hots, in terms of accuracy and speed. We 
conduct experimental tests on the classification system, and the results validate its 
efficacy on chat bot detection. 
4.1 Background and Related Work 
4.1.1 Chat Systems 
Internet chat is a real-time communication tool that allows on-line users to commu-
nicate via text in virtual spaces, called chat rooms or channels. There are a number 
of protocols that support chat [59], including IRC, Jabber/XMPP, MSN/WLM (Mi-
crosoft), OSCAR (AOL), and YCHT/YMSG (Yahoo!). The users connect to a chat 
server via chat clients that support a certain chat protocol, and they may browse 
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and join many chat rooms featuring a variety of topics. The chat server relays chat 
messages to and from on-line users. A chat service with a large user base might em-
ploy multiple chat servers. In addition, there are several multi-protocol chat clients, 
such as Pidgin (formerly GAIM) and 'Irillian, that allow a user to join different chat 
systems. 
Although IRC has existed for a long time, it has not gained mainstream popularity. 
This is mainly because its console-like interface and command-line-based operation are 
not user-friendly. The recent chat systems improve user experience by using graphic-
based interfaces, as well as adding attractive features such as avatars, emoticons, and 
audio-video communication capabilities. Our study is carried out on the Yahoo! chat 
network, one of the largest and most popular commercial chat systems. 
Yahoo! chat uses proprietary protocols, in which the chat messages are transmitted 
in plain-text, while commands, status and other meta data are transmitted as encoded 
binary data. Unlike those on most IRC networks, users on the Yahoo! chat network 
cannot create chat rooms with customized topics because this feature is disabled by 
Yahoo! to prevent abuses [82]. In addition, users on Yahoo! chat are required to pass 
a CAPTCHA word verification test in order to join a chat room. This recently-added 
feature is to guard against a major source of abuse-hots. 
4.1.2 Chat Bots 
The term bot, short for robot, refers to automated programs, that is, programs that 
do not require a human operator. A chat bot is a program that interacts with a chat 
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service to automate tasks for a human, e.g., creating chat logs. The first-generation 
chat bots were designed to help operate chat rooms, or to entertain chat users, e.g., 
quiz or quote hots. However, with the commercialization of the Internet, the main 
enterprise of chat bots is now sending chat spam. Chat bots deliver spam URLs via 
either links in chat messages or user profile links. A single bot operator, controlling 
a few hundred chat hots, can distribute spam links to thousands of users in different 
chat rooms, making chat bots very profitable to the bot operator who is paid per-click 
through affiliate programs. Other potential abuses of bots include spreading malware, 
phishing, booting, and similar malicious activities. 
A few countermeasures have been used to defend against the abuse of chat bots, 
though none of them are very effective. On the server side, CAPTCHA tests are 
used by Yahoo! chat in an effort to prevent chat hots joining chat rooms. However, 
this defense becomes ineffective as chat bots bypass CAPTCHA tests with human 
assistance. We have observed that bots continue to join chat rooms and sometimes 
even become the majority members of a chat room after the deployment of CAPTCHA 
tests. Third-party chat clients filter out chat bots, mainly based on key words or key 
phrases that are known to be used by chat bots. The drawback with this approach is 
that it cannot capture those unknown or evasive chat bots that do not use the known 
key words or phrases. 
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4.1.3 Related Work 
Dewes et al. [32] conducted a systematic measurement study of IRC and Web-chat 
traffic, revealing several statistical properties of chat traffic. (1) Chat sessions tend 
to last for a long time, and a significant number of IRC sessions last much longer 
than Web-chat sessions. (2) Chat session inter-arrival time follows an exponential 
distribution, while the distribution of message inter-arrival time is not exponential. 
(3) In terms of message size, all chat sessions are dominated by a large number of 
small packets. (4) Over an entire session, typically a user receives about 10 times as 
much data as he sends. However, very active users in Web-chat and automated scripts 
used in IRC may send more data than they receive. 
There is considerable overlap between chat and instant messaging (IM) systems, in 
terms of protocol and user base. Many widely used chat systems such as IRC predate 
the rise of IM systems, and have great impact upon the IM system and protocol 
design. In return, some new features that make the IM systems more user-friendly 
have been back-ported to the chat systems. For example, IRC, a classic chat system, 
implements a number of IM-like features, such as presence and file transfers, in its 
current versions. Some messaging service providers, such as Yahoo!, offer both chat 
and IM accesses to their end-user clients. With this in mind, we outline some related 
work on IM systems. Liu et al. [73] explored client-side and server-side methods 
for detecting and filtering IM spam or spim. However, their evaluation is based on 
a corpus of short e-mail spam messages, due to the lack of data on spim. In [77], 
Mannan et al. studied IM worms, automated malware that spreads on IM systems 
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using the IM contact list. Leveraging the spreading characteristics of IM malware, 
Xie et al. [130] presented an IM malware detection and suppression system based on 
the honeypot concept. 
Botnets consist of a large number of slave computing assets, which are also called 
"hots". However, the usage and behavior of hots in botnets are quite different from 
those of chat hots. The hots in botnets are malicious programs designed specifically to 
run on compromised hosts on the Internet, and they are used as platforms to launch a 
variety of illicit and criminal activities such as credential theft, phishing, distributed 
denial-of-service attacks, etc. In contrast, chat hots are automated programs designed 
mainly to interact with chat users by sending spam messages and URLs in chat rooms. 
Although having been used by botnets as command and control mechanisms [49, 4], 
IRC and other chat systems do not play an irreplaceable role in botnets. In fact, due 
to the increasing focus on detecting and thwarting IRC-based botnets (30, 52, 53], 
recently emerged botnets, such as Phatbot, Nugache, Slapper, and Sinit, show a 
tendency towards using P2P-based control architectures [123]. 
Chat spam shares some similarities with email spam. Like email spam, chat 
spam contains advertisements of illegal services and counterfeit goods, and solicits 
human users to click spam URLs. Chat hots employ many text obfuscation tech-
niques used by email spam such as word padding and synonym substitution. Since 
the detection of email spam can be easily converted into the problem of text clas-
sification, many content-based filters utilize machine-learning algorithms for filtering 
email spam. Among them, Bayesian-based statistical approaches [51, 135, 17, 137, 72] 
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have achieved high accuracy and performance. Although very successful, Bayesian-
based spam detection techniques still can be evaded by carefully crafted messages 
[128, 74, 64]. 
4.2 Measurement 
In this section, we detail our measurements on Yahoo! chat, one of the most popular 
commercial chat services. The focus of our measurements is on public messages posted 
to Yahoo! chat rooms. The logging of chat messages is available on the standard 
Yahoo! chat client, as well as most third party chat clients. Upon entering chat, all 
chat users are shown a disclaimer from Yahoo! that other users can log their messages. 
However, we consider the contents of the chat logs to be sensitive, so we only present 
fully-anonymized statistics. 
Our data was collected between August and November of 2007. In late August, 
Yahoo! implemented a CAPTCHA check on entering chat rooms [85, 7], creating 
technical problems that made their chat rooms unstable for about two weeks [5, 6]. 
At the same time, Yahoo! implemented a protocol update, preventing most third 
party chat clients, used by a large proportion of Yahoo! chat users, from accessing the 
chat rooms. In short, these upgrades made the chat rooms difficult to be accessed for 
both chat bots and humans. In mid to late September, both chat bot and third party 
client developers updated their programs. By early October, chat bots were found in 
Yahoo! chat [84], possibly bypassing the CAPTCHA check with human assistance. 
Due to these problems and the lack of chat bots in September and early October, we 
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perform our analysis on August and November chat logs. In August and November, 
we collected a total of 1,440 hours of chat logs. There are 147 individual chat logs 
from 21 different chat rooms. The process of reading and labeling these chat logs 
required about 100 hours. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first in the large 
scale measurement and classification of chat bots. 
4.2.1 Log-Based Classification 
In order to characterize the behavior of human users and that of chat bots, we need 
two sets of chat logs pre-labeled as bots and humans. To create such datasets, we 
perform log-based classification by reading and labeling a large number of chat logs. 
The chat users are labeled in three categories: human, bot, and ambiguous. 
The log-based classification process is a variation of the Thring test. In a standard 
Thring test [118], the examiner converses with a test subject (a possible machine) 
for five minutes, and then decides if the subject is a human or a machine. In our 
classification process, the examiner observes a long conversation between a test subject 
(a possible chat bot) and one or more third parties, and then decides if the subject 
is a human or a chat bot. In addition, our examiner checks the content of URLs 
and typically observes multiple instances of the same chat bot, which further improve 
our classification accuracy. Moreover, given that the best practice of current artificial 
intelligences [116] can rarely pass a non-restricted Thring test, our classification of 
chat bots should be very accurate. 
Although a Thring test is subjective, we outline a few important criteria. The 
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main criterion for being labeled as human is a high proportion of specific, intelligent, 
and human-like responses to other users. In general, if a user's responses suggest 
more advanced intelligence than current state-of-the-art AI [116], then the user can 
be labeled as human. The ambiguous label is reserved for non-English, incoherent, 
or non-communicative users. The criteria for being classified as bot are as follows. 
The first is the lack of the intelligent responses required for the human label. The 
second is the repetition of similar phrases either over time or from other users (other 
instances of the same chat bot). The third is the presence of spam or malware URLs 
in messages or in the user's profile. 
4.2.2 Analysis 
In total, our measurements capture 14 different types of chat bots. The different types 
of chat bots are determined by their triggering mechanisms and text obfuscation 
schemes. The former relates to message timing, and the latter relates to message 
content. The two main types of triggering mechanisms observed in our measurements 
are timer-based and response-based. A timer-based bot sends messages based on a 
timer, which can be periodic (i.e., fixed time intervals) or random (i.e., variable time 
intervals). A response-based bot sends messages based on programmed responses to 
specific content in messages posted by other users. 
There are many different kinds of text obfuscation schemes. The purpose of text 
obfuscation is to vary the content of messages and make bots more difficult to rec-
ognize or appear more human-like. We observed four basic text obfuscation methods 
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that chat hots use to evade filtering or detection. First, chat bots introduce random 
characters or space into their messages, similar to some spam e-mails. Second, chat 
bots use various synonym phrases to avoid obvious keywords. By this method, a 
template with several synonyms for multiple words can lead to thousands of possible 
messages. Third, chat bots use short messages or break up long messages into multiple 
messages to evade message filters that work on a message-by-message basis. Fourth, 
and most interestingly, chat bots replay human phrases entered by other chat users. 
According to our observation, the main activity of chat bots is to send spam links 
to chat users. There are two approaches that chat bots use to distribute spam links in 
chat rooms. The first is to post a message with a spam link directly in the chat room. 
The second is to enter the spam URL in the chat bot's user profile and then convince 
the users to view the profile and click the link. Our logs also include some examples 
of malware spreading via chat rooms. The behavior of malware-spreading chat bots 
is very similar to that of spam-sending chat bots, as both attempt to lure human 
users to click links. Although we did not perform detailed malware analysis on links 
posted in the chat rooms and Yahoo! applies filters to block links to known malicious 
files, we found several worm instances in our data. There are 12 W32.1maut.AS [114] 
worms appeared in the August chat logs, and 23 W32.Imaut.AS worms appeared in 
the November chat logs. The November worms attempted to send malicious links 
but were blocked by Yahoo! (the malicious links in their messages being removed), 
however, the August worms were able to send out malicious links. 
The focus of our measurements is mainly on short term statistics, as these statistics 
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are most likely to be useful in chat bot classification. The two key measurement 
metrics in this study are inter-message delay and message size. Based on these two 
metrics, we profile the behavior of human and that of chat bots. Among chat bots, we 
further divide them into four different groups: periodic bots, random bots, responder 
bots, and replay bots. With respect to these short-term statistics, human and chat 
bots behave differently, as shown below. 
4.2.2.1 Humans 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Human Inter-Message Delay (a) and Message Size (b) 
Figure 4.1 shows the probability distributions of human inter-message delay and 
message size. Since the behavior of humans is persistent, we only draw the probability 
mass function (pmf) curves based on the August data. The previous study on Internet 
chat systems [32] observed that the distribution of inter-message delay in chat systems 
was heavy tailed. In general our measurement result conforms to that observation. 
The body part of the pmf curve in Figure 4.1 (a) (log-log scale) can be linearly fitted, 
indicating that the distribution of human inter-message delays follows a power law. 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Periodic Bot Inter-Message Delay (a) and Message Size 
(b) 
In other words, the distribution is heavy tailed. We also find that the pmf curve of 
human message size in Figure 4.1 (b) can be well fitted by an exponential distribution 
with >. = 0.034 after excluding the initial spike. 
4.2.2.2 Periodic Bots 
A periodic bot posts messages mainly at regular time intervals. The delay periods of 
periodic bots, especially those bots that use long delays, may vary by several seconds. 
The variation of delay period may be attributed to either transmission delay caused 
by network traffic congestion or chat server delay, or message emission delay incurred 
by system overloading on the bot hosting machine. The posting of periodic messages 
is a simple but effective mechanism for distributing messages, so it is not surprising 
that a substantial portion of chat bots use periodic timers. 
We display the probability distributions of inter-message delay and message size 
for periodic bots in Figure 4.2. We use '+' for displaying August data and '•' for 
90 
November data. The distributions of periodic bots are distinct from those of humans 
shown in Figure 4.1. The distribution of inter-message delay for periodic bots clearly 
manifests the timer-triggering characteristic of periodic bots. There are three clusters 
with high probabilities at time ranges [30-50], [100-110], and [150-170]. These clus-
ters correspond to the November periodic bots with timer values around 40 seconds 
and the August periodic bots with timer values around 105 and 160 seconds, respec-
tively. The message size pmf curve of the August periodic bots shows an interesting 
bell shape, much like a normal distribution. After examining message contents, we 
find that the bell shape may be attributed to the message composition method some 
August bots used. As shown in Appendix A, some August periodic bots compose a 
message using a single template. The template has several parts and each part is as-
sociated with several synonym phrases. Since the length of each part is independent 
and identically distributed, the length of whole message, i.e., the sum of all parts, 
should approximate a normal distribution. The November bots employ a similar com-
position method, but use several templates of different lengths. Thus, the message 
size distribution of the November periodic bots reflects the distribution of the lengths 
of the different templates, with the length of each individual template approximating 
a normal distribution. 
4.2.2.3 Random Bots 
A random bot posts messages at random time intervals. The random bots in our data 
used different random distributions, some discrete and others continuous, to generate 
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inter-message delays. The use of random timers makes random bots appear more 
human-like than periodic bots. In statistical terms, however, random bots exhibit 
quite different inter-message delay distributions than humans. 
Figure 4.3 depicts the probability distributions of inter-message delay and message 
size for random bots. Compared to periodic bots, random bots have more dispersed 
timer values. In addition, the August random bots have a large overlap with the 
November random bots. The points with high probabilities (greater than 10-2 ) in 
the time range [30-90] in Figure 4.3 (a) represent the August and November random 
bots that use a discrete distribution of 40, 64, and 88 seconds. The wide November 
cluster with medium probabilities in the time range [40-130] is created by the Novem-
ber random bots that use a uniform distribution between 45 and 125 seconds. The 
probabilities of different message sizes for the August and November random bots are 
mainly in the size range [0-50]. Unlike periodic bots, most random bots do not use 
template or synonym replacement, but directly repeat messages. Thus, as their mes-
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sages are selected from a database at random, the message size distribution reflects 
the proportion of messages of different sizes in the database. 
4.2.2.4 Responder Bots 
A responder bot sends messages based on the content of messages in the chat room. 
For example, a message ending with a question mark may trigger a responder bot to 
send a vague response with a URL, as shown in Appendix A. The vague response, 
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in the context, may trick human users into believing that the responder is a human 
and further clicking the link. Moreover, the message triggering mechanism makes 
responder hots look more like humans in terms of timing statistics than periodic or 
random hots. 
To gain more insights into responder bots, we managed to obtain a configuration 
file for a typical responder bot [119]. There are a number of parameters for making 
the responder bot mimic humans. The bot can be configured with a fixed typing rate, 
so that responses with different lengths take different time to "type." The bot can 
also be set to either ignore triggers while simulating typing, or rate-limit responses. 
In addition, responses can be assigned with probabilities, so that the responder bot 
responds to a given trigger in a random manner. 
Figure 4.4 shows the probability distributions of inter-message delay and message 
size for responder hots. Note that only the distribution of the August responder 
hots is shown due to the small number of responder hots found in November. Since 
the message emission of responder hots is triggered by human messages, theoretically 
the distribution of inter-message delays of responder hots should demonstrate certain 
similarity to that of humans. Figure 4.4 (a) confirms this hypothesis. Like Figure 
4.1 (a), the pmf of responder bots (excluding the head part) in log-log scale exhibits 
a clear sign of a heavy tail. But unlike human messages, the sizes of responder bot 
messages vary in a much narrower range (between 1 and 160). The bell shape of 
the distribution for message size less than 100 indicates that responder hots share 
a similar message composition technique with periodic bots, and their messages are 
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composed as templates with multiple parts, as shown in Appendix A. 
4.2.2.5 Replay Bots 
A replay bot not only sends its own messages, but also repeats messages from other 
users to appear more like a human user. In our experience, replayed phrases are 
related to the same topic but do not appear in the same chat room as the original 
ones. Therefore, replayed phrases are either taken from other chat rooms on the same 
topic or saved previously in a database and replayed. 
The use of replayed phrases in a crowded or "noisy" chat room does, in fact, 
make replay bots look more like human to inattentive users. The replayed phrases are 
sometimes nonsensical in the context of the chat, but human users tend to naturally 
ignore such statements. When replay bots succeed in fooling human users, these users 
are more likely to click links posted by the bots or visit their profiles. Interestingly, 
replay bots sometimes replay phrases uttered by other chat bots, making them very 
easy to be recognized. The use of replay is potentially effective in thwarting detection 
methods, as detection tests must deal with a combination of human and bots phrases. 
By using human phrases, replay bots can easily defeat keyword-based message filters 
that filter message-by-message, as the human phrases should not be filtered out. 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the probability distributions of inter-message delay and mes-
sage size for replay bots. In terms of inter-message delay, a replay bot is just a 
variation of a periodic bot, which is demonstrated by the high spike in Figure 4.5 
(a). By using human phrases, replay bots successfully mimic human users in terms 
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Figure 4.6: Classification System Diagram 
of message size distribution. The message size distribution of replay hots in Figure 
4.5 (b) largely resembles that of human users, and can be fitted by an exponential 
distribution with ,\ = 0.028. 
4.3 Classification System 
This section describes the design of our chat bot classification system. The two main 
components of our classification system are the entropy classifier and the machine 
learning classifier. The basic structure of our chat bot classification system is shown in 
Figure 4.6. The two classifiers, entropy and machine learning, operate concurrently to 
process input and make classification decisions, while the machine learning classifier 
relies on the entropy classifier to build the bot corpus. The entropy classifier uses 
entropy and corrected conditional entropy to score chat users and then classifies them 
as chat bots or humans. The main task of the entropy classifier is to capture new chat 
hots and add them to the chat bot corpus. The human corpus can be taken from a 
database of clean chat logs or created by manual log-based classification, as described 
in Section 5.2. The machine learning classifier uses the bot and human corpora to 
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learn text patterns of bots and humans, and then it can quickly classify chat bots 
based on these patterns. The two classifiers are detailed as follows. 
4.3.1 Entropy Classifier 
The entropy classifier makes classification decisions based on entropy and entropy 
rate measures of message sizes and inter-message delays for chat users. If either the 
entropy or entropy rate is low for these characteristics, it indicates the regular or 
predictable behavior of a likely chat bot. If both the entropy and entropy rate is 
high for these characteristics, it indicates the irregular or unpredictable behavior of a 
possible human. 
To use entropy measures for classification, we set a cutoff score for each entropy 
measure. If a test score is greater than or equal to the cutoff score, the chat user 
is classified as a human. If the test score is less than the cutoff score, the chat user 
is classified as a chat bot. The specific cutoff score is an important parameter in 
determining the false positive and true positive rates of the entropy classifier. On the 
one hand, if the cutoff score is too high, then too many humans will be misclassified as 
bots. On the other hand, if the cutoff score is too low, then too many chat bots will be 
misclassified as humans. Due to the importance of achieving a low false positive rate, 
we select the cutoff scores based on human entropy scores to achieve a targeted false 
positive rate. The specific cutoff scores and targeted false positive rates are described 
in Section 5.4. 
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4.3.1.1 Entropy Measures 
The entropy rate, which is the average entropy per random variable, can be used as 
a measure of complexity or regularity [101, 105, 44]. The entropy rate is defined as 
the conditional entropy of a sequence of infinite length. The entropy rate is upper-
bounded by the entropy of the first-order probability density function or first-order 
entropy. A independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process has an entropy rate 
equal to its first-order entropy. A highly complex process has a high entropy rate, 
while a highly regular process has a low entropy rate. 
A random process X = {Xi} is defined as an indexed sequence of random variables. 
To give the definition of the entropy rate of a random process, we first define the 
entropy of a sequence of random variables as: 
L P(x1, ... , Xm) log P(x1, ... , Xm), 
X1, ... ,Xm 
where P(x1, ... , Xm) is the joint probability P(X1 = x1, ... , Xm = Xm)· 
Then, from the entropy of a sequence of random variables, we define the conditional 
entropy of a random variable given a previous sequence of random variables as: 
Lastly, the entropy rate of a random process is defined as: 
Since the entropy rate is the conditional entropy of a sequence of infinite length, 
98 
it cannot be measure for finite samples. Thus, we estimate the entropy rate with the 
conditional entropy of finite samples. In practice, we replace probability density func-
tions with empirical probability density functions based on the method of histograms. 
The data is binned in Q bins of approximately equal probability. The empirical prob-
ability density functions are determined by the proportions of bin number sequences 
in the data, i.e., the proportion of a sequence is the probability of that sequence. 
The estimates of the entropy and conditional entropy, based on empirical probability 
density functions, are represented as: EN and CE, respectively. 
There is a problem with the estimation of CE(Xm I X1, ... , Xm-d for some values 
of m. The conditional entropy tends to zero as m increases, due to limited data. If a 
specific sequence of length m - 1 is found only once in the data, then the extension 
of this sequence to length m will also be found only once. Therefore, the length 
m sequence can be predicted by the length m - 1 sequence, and the length m and 
m- 1 sequences cancel out. If no sequence of length m is repeated in the data, then 
CE(Xm I X1, ... ,Xm-d is zero, even for i.i.d. processes. 
To solve the problem of limited data, without fixing the length of m, we use the 
corrected conditional entropy [101] represented as CC E. The corrected conditional 
entropy is defined as: 
where perc(Xm) is the percentage of unique sequences of length m and EN(Xl) is 
the entropy with m fixed at 1 or the first-order entropy. 
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Table 4.1: Message Composition of Chat Bot and Human Datasets 
AUG. BOTS NOV. BOTS HUMANS 
periodic I random I responder periodic I random I replay human 
#of msgs. 25,258 1 13,998 1 6,160 10,639 1 22,820 1 8,054 342,696 
The estimate of the entropy rate is the minimum of the corrected conditional 
entropy over different values of m. The minimum of the corrected conditional entropy 
is considered to be the best estimate of the entropy rate from the available data. 
4.3.2 Machine Learning Classifier 
The machine learning classifier uses the content of chat messages to identify chat bots. 
Since chat messages (including emoticons) are text, the identification of chat bots can 
be perfectly fitted into the domain of machine learning text classification. Within 
the machine learning paradigm, the text classification problem can be formalized as 
f : T x C ____, {0, 1}, where f is the classifier, T = {t1, t2, ... , tn} is the texts to be 
classified, and C = {cl,c2, ... ,ck} is the set of pre-defined classes [108]. Value 1 for 
f ( ti, Cj) indicates that text ti is in class c1 and value 0 indicates the opposite decision. 
There are many techniques that can be used for text classification, such as nai:ve Bayes, 
support vector machines, and decision trees. Among them, Bayesian classifiers have 
been very successful in text classification, particularly in email spam detection. Due to 
the similarity between chat spam and email spam, we choose Bayesian classification 
for our machine learning classifier for detecting chat bots. We leave study on the 
applicability of other types of machine learning classifiers to our future work. 
Within the framework of Bayesian classification, identifying if chat message M is 
issued by a bot or human is achieved by computing the probability of M being from a 
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bot with the given message content, i.e., P(C = botiM). If the probability is equal to 
or greater than a pre-defined threshold, then message M is classified as a bot message. 
According to Bayes theorem, 
p b M _ P(Mibot)P(bot) _ P(Mibot)P(bot) 
( otl ) - P(M) - P(Mibot)P(bot) + P(Mihuman)P(human) · 
A message Misdescribed by its feature vector (ft, h, ... , fn)· A feature f is a single 
word or a combination of multiple words in the message. To simplify computation, 
in practice it is usually assumed that all features are conditionally independent with 
each other for the given category. Thus, we have 
n 
P(bot) fi P(filbot) 
P(botiM) = n i==l n 
P(bot) fi P(fiibot) + P(human) fi P(fiihuman) 
i==l i==l 
The value of P(botiM) may vary in different implementations (see [51, 137] for im-
plementation details) of Bayesian classification due to differences in assumption and 
simplification. 
Given the abundance of implementations of Bayesian classification, we directly 
adopt one implementation, namely CRM 114[135], as our machine learning classifica-
tion component. CRM 114 is a powerful text classification system that has achieved 
very high accuracy in email spam identification. The default classifier of CRM 114, 
OSB (Orthogonal Sparse Bigram), is a type of Bayesian classifier. Different from 
common Bayesian classifiers which treat individual words as features, OSB uses word 
pairs as features instead. OSB first chops the whole input into multiple basic units 
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with five consecutive words in each unit. Then, it extracts four word pairs from 
each unit to construct features, and derives their probabilities. Finally, OSB applies 
Bayes theorem to compute the overall probability that the text belongs to one class 
or another. 
4.4 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed classification system. 
Our classification tests are based on chat logs collected from the Yahoo! chat system. 
We test the two classifiers, entropy-based and machine-learning-based, against chat 
bots from August and November datasets. The machine learning classifier is tested 
with fully-supervised training and entropy-classifier-based training. The accuracy of 
classification is measured in terms of false positive and false negative rates. The false 
positives are those human users that are misclassified as chat bots, while the false 
negatives are those chat bots that are misclassified as human users. The speed of 
classification is mainly determined by the minimum number of messages that are re-
quired for accurate classification. In general, a high number means slow classification, 
whereas a low number means fast classification. 
Table 4.2: True Positive and Negative Rates for Entropy Classifier 
AUG. BOTS NOV. BOTS HUMANS 
periodic random responder periodic random replay human 
test true pos. true pos. true pos. true pos. true pos. true pos. false pos. 
EN(imd) 121/121 68/68 1/30 51/51 109/109 40/40 7/1713 
CCE(imd) 121/121 49/68 4/30 51/51 109/109 40/40 11/1713 
EN(ms) 92/121 7/68 8/30 46/51 34/109 0/40 7/1713 
CCE(ms) 77/121 8/68 30/30 51/51 6/109 0/40 11/1713 
OVERALL 121/121 68/68 30/30 51/51 109/109 40/40 17/1713 
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4.4.1 Experimental Setup 
The chat logs used in our experiments are mainly in three datasets: (1) human chat 
logs from August 2007, (2) bot chat logs from August 2007, and (3) bot chat logs 
from November 2007. In total, these chat logs contain 342,696 human messages and 
87,049 bot messages. In our experiments, we use the first half of each chat log, human 
and bot, for training our classifiers and the second half for testing our classifiers. The 
composition of the chat logs for the three datasets is listed in Table 4.1. 
The entropy classifier only requires a human training set. We use the human 
training set to determine the cutoff scores, which are used by the entropy classifier to 
decide whether a test sample is a human or bot. The target false positive rate is set 
at 0.01. To achieve this false positive rate, the cutoff scores are set at approximately 
the 1st percentile of human training set scores. Then, samples that score higher than 
the cutoff are classified as humans, while samples that score lower than the cutoff are 
classified as bots. The entropy classifier uses two entropy tests: entropy and corrected 
conditional entropy. The entropy test estimates first-order entropy, and the corrected 
conditional entropy estimates higher-order entropy or entropy rate. The corrected 
conditional entropy test is more precise with coarse-grain bins, whereas the entropy 
test is more accurate with fine-grains bins [44]. Therefore, we use Q = 5 for the 
corrected conditional entropy test and Q = 256 with m fixed at 1 for the entropy test. 
We run classification tests for each bot type using the entropy classifier and ma-
chine learning classifier. The machine learning classifier is tested based on fully-
supervised training and then entropy-based training. In fully-supervised training, 
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the machine learning classifier is trained with manually labeled data, as described 
in Section 5.2. In entropy-based training, the machine learning classifier is trained 
with data labeled by the entropy classifier. For each evaluation, the entropy classifier 
uses samples of 100 messages, while the machine learning classifier uses samples of 25 
messages. 
4.4.2 Experimental Results 
We now present the results for the entropy classifier and machine learning classifier. 
The four chat bot types are: periodic, random, responder, and replay. The classifi-
cation tests are organized by chat bot type, and are ordered by increasing detection 
difficulty. 
4.4.2.1 Entropy Classifier 
The detection results of the entropy classifier are listed in Table 4.2, which includes 
the results of the entropy test (EN) and corrected conditional entropy test (CCE) for 
inter-message delay (imd), and message size (ms). The overall results for all entropy-
based tests are shown in the final row of the table. The true positives are the total 
unique bot samples correctly classified as hots. The false positives are the total unique 
human samples mistakenly classified as hots. 
Periodic Bots: As the simplest group of hots, periodic hots are the easiest 
to detect. They use different fixed timers and repeatedly post messages at regular 
intervals. Therefore, their inter-message delays are concentrated in a narrower range 
than those of humans, resulting in lower entropy than that of humans. The inter-
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message delay EN and CCE tests detect 100% of all periodic bots in both August 
and November datasets. The message size EN and CCE tests detect 76% and 63% of 
the August periodic bots, respectively, and 90% and 100% of the November periodic 
bots, respectively. These slightly lower detection rates are due to a small proportion of 
humans with low entropy scores that overlap with some periodic bots. These humans 
post mainly short messages, resulting in message size distributions with low entropy. 
Random Bots: The random bots use random timers with different distributions. 
Some random hots use discrete timings, e.g., 40, 64, or 88 seconds, while the others 
use continuous timings, e.g., uniformly distributed delays between 45 and 125 seconds. 
The inter-message delay EN and CCE tests detect 100% of all random bots, with 
one exception: the inter-message delay CCE test against the August random hots 
only achieves 72% detection rate, which is caused by the following two conditions: (1) 
the range of message delays of random hots is close to that of humans; (2) sometimes 
the randomly-generated delay sequences have similar entropy rate to human patterns. 
The message size EN and CCE tests detect 31% and 6% of August random bots, 
respectively, and 7% and 8% of November random bots, respectively. These low 
detection rates are again due to a small proportion of humans with low message 
size entropy scores. However, unlike periodic bots, the message size distribution of 
random bots is highly dispersed, and thus, a larger proportion of random bots have 
high entropy scores, which overlap with those of humans. 
Responder Bots: The responder bots are among the advanced bots, and they 
behave more like humans than random or periodic bots. They are triggered to post 
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messages by certain human phrases. As a result, their timings are quite similar to 
those of humans. 
The inter-message delay EN and CCE tests detect very few responder hots, only 
3% and 13%, respectively. This demonstrates that human-message-triggered respond-
ing is a simple yet very effective mechanism for imitating the timing of human inter-
actions. However, the detection rate for the message size EN test is slightly better 
at 27%, and the detection rate for the message size CCE test reaches 100%. While 
the message size distribution has sufficiently high entropy to frequently evade the EN 
test, there is some dependence between subsequent message sizes, and thus, the CCE 
detects the low entropy pattern over time. 
Replay Bots: The replay hots also belong to the advanced and human-like hots. 
They use replay attacks to fool humans. More specifically, the hots replay phrases they 
observed in chat rooms. Although not sophisticated in terms of implementation, the 
replay hots are quite effective in deceiving humans as well as frustrating our message-
size-based detections: the message size EN and CCE tests both have detection rates 
of 0%. Despite their clever trick, the timing of replay hots is periodic and easily 
detected. The inter-message delay EN and CCE tests are very successful at detecting 
replay hots, both with 100% detection accuracy. 
4.4.2.2 Supervised and Hybrid Machine Learning Classifiers 
The detection results of the machine learning classifier are listed in Table 4.3. Table 
4.3 shows the results for the fully-supervised machine learning (SupML) classifier 
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Table 4.3: True Positive and Negative Rates for Machine Learning and Hybrid Clas-
sifiers 
AUG. BOTS NOV. BOTS HUMANS 
periodic random responder periodic random replay human 
test true pas. true pas. true pas. true pas. true pas. true pas. false pas. 
SupML 121/121 68/68 30/30 14/51 104/109 1/40 0/1713 
SupM £retrained 121/121 68/68 30/30 51/51 109/109 40/40 0/1713 
EntML 121/121 68/68 30/30 51/51 109/109 40/40 1/1713 
and entropy-trained machine learning (EntM L) classifier, both trained on the Au-
gust training datasets, and the fully-supervised machine learning (SupM Lretrained) 
classifier trained on August and November training datasets. 
Periodic Bots: For the August dataset, both SupM L and EntM L classifiers 
detect 100% of all periodic bots. For the November dataset, however, the SupM L 
classifier only detects 27% of all periodic bots. The lower detection rate is due to 
the fact that 62% of the periodic bot messages in November chat logs are gener-
ated by new bots, making the SupM L classifier ineffective without re-training. The 
SupM Lretrained classifier detects 100% of November periodic bots. The EntM L 
classifier also achieves 100% for the November dataset. 
Random Bots: For the August dataset, both SupM L and EntM L classifiers 
detect 100% of all random bots. For the November dataset, the SupM L classifier 
detects 95% of all random bots, and the SupM Lretrained classifier detects 100% of 
all random bots. Although 52% of the random bots have been upgraded according to 
our observation, the old training set is still mostly effective because certain content 
features of August random bots still appear in November. The EntM L classifier again 
achieves 100% detection accuracy for the November dataset. 
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Responder Bots: We only present the detection results of responder bots for 
the August dataset, as the number of responder bots in the November dataset is very 
small. Although responder hots effectively mimic human timing, their message con-
tents are only slightly obfuscated and are easily detected. The SupM L and EntM L 
classifiers both detect 100% of all responder hots. 
Replay Bots: The replay bots only exist in the November dataset. The SupM L 
classifier detects only 3% of all replay bots, as these bots are newly introduced in 
November. The SupM Lretrained classifier detects 100% of all replay bots. The 
machine learning classifier reliably detects replay bots in the presence of a substantial 
number of replayed human phrases, indicating the effectiveness of machine learning 
techniques in chat bot classification. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter first presents a large-scale measurement study on Internet chat. We 
collected two-month chat logs for 21 different chat rooms from one of the top Internet 
chat service providers. From the chat logs, we identified a total of 14 different types 
of chat hots and grouped them into four categories: periodic bots, random hots, 
responder hots, and replay hots. Through statistical analysis on inter-message delay 
and message size for both chat bots and humans, we found that chat bots behave very 
differently from human users. More specifically, chat bots exhibit certain regularities 
in either inter-message delay or message size. Although responder bots and replay 
bots employ advanced techniques to behave more human-like in some aspects, they 
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still lack the overall sophistication of humans. 
Based on the measurement study, we further proposed a chat bot classification 
system, which utilizes entropy-based and machine-learning-based classifiers to accu-
rately detect chat bots. The entropy-based classifier exploits the low entropy charac-
teristic of chat bots in either inter-message delay or message size, while the machine-
learning-based classifier leverages the message content difference between humans and 
chat bots. The entropy-based classifier is able to detect unknown bots, including 
human-like bots such as responder and replay bots. However, it takes a relatively 
long time for detection, i.e., a large number of messages are required. Compared to 
the entropy-based classifier, the machine-learning-based classifier is much faster, i.e., 
a small number of messages are required. In addition to bot detection, a major task of 
the entropy-based classifier is to build and maintain the bot corpus. With the help of 
bot corpus, the machine-learning-based classifier is trained, and consequently, is able 
to detect chat bots quickly and accurately. Our experimental results demonstrate 
that the hybrid classification system is fast in detecting known bots and is accurate 
in identifying previously-unknown bots. 
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Chapter 5 
Detecting Online Game Bots 
The online gaming market has experienced rapid growth for the past few years. In 
2008, online gaming revenues were estimated at $7.6 billion world-wide [81]. The 
most profitable online games are subscription-based massive multiplayer online games 
(MMOGs), such as World of Warcraft. In 2008, World of Warcraft reached 11.5 
million subscribers [16]. Each subscriber has to pay as much as $15 per month. It 
is no surprise that MMOGs make up about half of online gaming revenues [81]. As 
MMOGs gain in economic and social importance, it has become imperative to shield 
MMOGs from malicious exploits for the benefit of on-line game companies and players. 
Currently the most common form of malicious exploit and the most difficult to 
thwart, is the use of game bots to gain unfair advantages. Game bots have plagued 
most of the popular MMOGs, including World of Warcraft [80, 104, 129, 100, 95], 
Second Life [92], and Ultima Online [40, 113], and some non-MMOGs such as Diablo 2 
[33]. The primary goal of game bots is to amass game currency, items, and experience. 
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Interestingly, game currency can be traded for real currency1, making cheating a 
profitable enterprise. Since MMOGs are small economies, a large influx of game 
currency causes hyper-inflation, hurting all players. Thus, the use of game bots is 
a serious problem for not only giving some players unfair advantages but also for 
creating large imbalances in game economies as a whole. With a large investment in 
development costs, game service providers consider anti-cheating mechanisms a high 
priority. 
The existing methods for combating bots are not successful in the protection of 
on-line games. The approaches based on human interactive proofs (HIPs), such as 
CAPTCHAs, are the most commonly used to distinguish bots from humans. However, 
the inherent interactive requirement makes HIP-based approaches inadequate to apply 
in MMOGs. In particular, multiple tests are needed throughout a game session to 
block the login of bots; otherwise, a malicious player can pass the one-time test and log 
a bot into the game. Although multiple tests can foil the malicious player's attempt for 
bot login, they are too obtrusive and distractive for a regular player to tolerate as well. 
A different approach, taken by some game companies, makes use of a process monitor 
to scan for known bot or cheat programs running on a player's computer. Blizzard, 
the makers of World of Warcraft, developed such a system called the Warden that 
scans processes and sends information back to their servers. A number of similar 
anti-cheat systems have been built for other games [39, 120, 94, 35]. However, this 
scan-based approach has proven ineffective, and even worse, raises privacy concerns. 
1The exchange rate for World of Warcraft is 1,000 gold to $11.70 as of July 25th, 2009 [117]. 
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation views the Warden as spyware [79]. 
Besides technical approaches, Blizzard has pursued legal action against bot makers 
[9], claiming over $1 million per year in additional operating costs caused by game 
bots in their lawsuit [15]. Moreover, Blizzard has banned thousands of accounts for 
cheating [21], yet many players continue cheating via bots and slip through the cracks 
[95, 100]. 
In this chapter, we introduce an approach based on human observational proofs 
(HOPs) to capture game bots. HOPs offer two distinct advantages over HIPs. First, 
HOPs provide continuous monitoring throughout a session. Second, HOPs are non-
interactive, i.e., no test is presented to a player, making HOPs completely non-
obtrusive. The use of HOPs is mainly motivated by the problems faced by HIPs 
and methods used in behavioral biometric systems [96, 103, 43, 2]. Similar behavior-
based approaches have been used in many previous intrusion detection systems [46, ? , 
67, 102, 121]. We collect a series of user-input measurements from a popular MMOG, 
World of Warcraft, to study the behaviors of current game bots and humans. While 
human players visually recognize objects on the screen and physically control the 
mouse and keyboard, game bots synthetically generate mouse and keyboard events 
and cannot directly recognize most objects. Our measurement results clearly show 
the fundamental differences between current game bots and humans in how certain 
tasks are performed in the game. Passively observing these differences, HOPs provide 
an effective way to detect current game bots. 
Based on HOPs, we design and develop a game bot defense system that analyzes 
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user-input data to differentiate game bots from human players in a timely manner. 
The proposed HOP system consists of two major components: a client-side exporter 
and a server-side analyzer. The exporter is responsible for sending a stream of user-
input actions to the server. The analyzer then processes the user-input stream and 
decides whether the client is operated by a bot or a human. The core of the analyzer 
is a cascade neural network that "learns" the behaviors of normal human players, as 
neural networks are known to perform well with user-input data [2, 90, 91]. Note 
that the latest MMOGs virtually all support automatic updates, so the deployment 
of the client-side exporter is not an issue. Moreover, the overhead at the client side is 
negligible and the overhead at the server side is small and affordable in terms of CPU 
and memory consumptions even with thousands of players per server. To validate the 
efficacy of our defense system, we conduct experiments based on user-input traces of 
bots and humans. The HOP system is able to capture 99.80% of current game bots 
for World of Warcraft within 39.60 seconds on average. 
It is an arms race between game exploits and their countermeasures. Once highly 
motivated bot developers know the HOP approach, it is possible for them to create 
more advanced game bots to evade the HOP system. However, the purpose of the 
HOP system is to raise the bar against game exploits and force a determined bot 
developer to spend significant time and effort in building next-generation game bots 
for detection evasion. Note that, to operate the game in a human-like manner, game 
bots have to process complex visuals and model different aspects of human-computer 
interaction and behavior, which we believe is non-trivial to succeed. 
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5.1 Background 
In this section, we first briefly present the evolution of game bots. Then, we de-
scribe the game playing behaviors of human players and game bots, respectively, and 
highlight their differences in a qualitative way. 
5.1.1 Game Bots 
A variety of exploits have appeared in the virtual game world for fun, for win, and for 
profit. Among these game exploits, game bots are regarded as the most commonly-
used and difficult-to-handle exploit. The earliest game bots were developed for the first 
generation MMOGs such as Ultima Online [113]. Even at that time, bot operators 
were already quite sophisticated, creating small server farms to run their bots [40, 
113]. At the early era of game bots, most of bot programmers wrote their own game 
clients. However, as a countermeasure, game companies often update games, breaking 
operations of those custom game clients. Bot programmers were forced to update 
their game clients, keeping up with the latest game version. This cycle proves to be 
very tedious for game bot programmers. Moreover, the complexity of game clients 
has grown continuously, making it increasingly difficult to develop and maintain a 
standalone custom game client. 
The arms race between game vendor and bot developer has led to the birth of an 
interesting type of game bots that, much like humans, play games by reading from 
screen and using the mouse and keyboard. These advanced bots operate the standard 
game client by simply sending mouse and keyboard events, reading certain pixels from 
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the screen, and possibly reading a few key regions in the memory address space of the 
game application. Most bots are equipped with macro scripting capabilities, similar to 
programs like Autolt [10], which enables bots to be easily reprogrammed and quickly 
adapted to the changes made by game companies. 
5.1.2 Game Playing Behaviors 
MMOGs, such as World of Warcraft, entertain players by providing a large degree 
of freedom in terms of actions a player can perform. In the game world, a player 
controls a virtual character (avatar) to explore the landscape, fight monsters, complete 
quests and interact with other players. In addition, a player can further customize 
the character by learning skills and purchasing items (such as armor, weapons, and 
even pets) with virtual currency. Each game activity requires a player to interact 
with the game in a different fashion. As a result, it is expected that the inputs of 
a human player will exhibit burstiness with strong locality and the input contents 
vary significantly for different tasks through game play. However, when a bot is used 
to play the game, its main purpose is to gain rewards (level and virtual currency) 
without human intervention by automating and repeating simple actions (such as 
killing monsters). Being much less sophisticated than human, bot actions would show 
regular patterns and limited varieties. 
Besides the high-level behavioral differences, humans and hots also interact with 
the game very differently, despite that both interact with the game via mouse and 
keyboard. As biological entities, humans perceive the graphical output of the game 
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optically, and feed input to the game by physically operating devices such as keyboard 
and mouse. In contrast, bots are computer programs that have no concept of vision 
and are not bounded by mechanical physics. While bots can analyze game graphics, 
it is computationally expensive. To avoid this computation cost, whenever possible, 
bots attempt to obtain necessary information, such as the locations of the avatar, 
monsters and other characters, and the properties (health, level, etc.) of the avatar, 
by reading the memory of the game program. 
In general, bots control the avatar by simulating input from devices via OS API 
calls, such as setting key press state or repositioning mouse cursor. The techniques 
used by bots are often crude, but in most cases, quite effective. For example, without 
reading the graphics or scanning the terrain, a bot can navigate to a target location 
by knowing just two coordinates-the current location of the avatar and that of the 
target. The bot then tries to approach the target location by steering the avatar to go 
forward, left and right, and then checks its progress by polling the two coordinates. 
If the avatar location does not change in a given amount of time, the bot assumes 
that an obstacle (trees, fences, steep terrain, etc.) is in the way and tries to navigate 
around it by moving backward a few steps, turning left or right, and going forward. 
Occasionally, graphics analysis can be useful, such as when picking up items on the 
ground. The bot can again handle this situation in a simple and efficient manner by 
exploiting the game user interface. When the cursor is placed on top of an object, the 
game would display a small information window on the lower-right corner. Thus, the 
bot moves the mouse cursor in grid patterns, and relies on the change of pixel colors 
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on the lower-right corner of the screen to know if it has found the object. 
5.2 Game Playing Characterization 
In this section, we examine how bots and humans behave in the game, in order to 
have a deep understanding of the differences between humans and bots. Based on 
our game measurements, we quantitatively characterize the game playing behaviors 
of human players and bots, respectively. The behavioral differences between bots and 
humans form the basis for our HOP-based system. 
5.2.1 The Glider Bot 
We select the Glider bot [80] as the sample game bot for our research. The Glider bot 
is a very popular game bot for World of Warcraft. It runs concurrently with the game 
client, but requires system administrator privileges. This escalated privilege helps 
the Glider bot to circumvent the Warden anti-bot system, and enables it to access 
the internal information of the game client via cross-process-address-space reading. 
It operates by using a "profile"-a set of configurations including several waypoints 
(map coordinates in the game world) and options, such as levels of monsters to fight. 
When in operation, the game bot controls the avatar to repeatedly run between the 
given waypoints, search and fight monsters that match the given criteria, and collect 
bonus items after winning fights. 
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Table 5.1: Definitions of User-Input Actions 
Action Definition 
Keystroke The press and release bf a key. 
A series of continuous mouse 
cursor position changes with no 
Point mouse button pressed; the time-
stamps for each pair of cursor 
position changes are no more 
than 0.4 seconds apart. 
Pause A period of 0.4 seconds or longer 
with no actions. 
The press and release of a mouse 
Click button; the cursor travels no more than 10 pixels between the press 
and release. 
Point-and-Click A point followed by a click within 0.4 seconds. 
The press and release of a mouse 
Drag-and-Drop button; the cursor travels more 
than 10 pixels between the press 
and release. 
5.2.2 Input Data Collection 
We collect player input data for both human and bot using an external program in 
a non-intrusive manner, i.e., no modification to the game client program. The input 
data collection program, a modified version of RUI [69], runs concurrently with the 
game, polling and recording the keyboard and mouse input device status with clock 
resolution close to 0.015625 second (approximate 64 times/sec). Each input event, 
such as key press or cursor position change, is recorded along with a time stamp 
relative to the starting time of the recording. 
We invite 30 different human players to play World of Warcraft and collect 55 hours 
of their user-input traces. Correspondingly, we run the game bot with 10 different 
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profiles in 7 locations in the game world for 40 hours and collect its input traces. The 
10 profiles are bot configurations with different sets of waypoints that the bot follows 
while farming, i.e., killing monsters and gathering treasure. The profiles are setup 
in 7 locations with different monster levels (from levels 1 to 40), monster densities 
(sparse to dense), and different obstacles (barren plains to forest with lots of small 
trees). The game bot profiles are half run with a warrior and half run with a mage. 
These two bot characters range from level 1 to over 30 in the traces. 
We conduct post processing on the input trace data to extract information with 
regard to high-level user-input actions. For example, we pair up a key press event 
with a subsequent key release event of the same key to form a keystroke action; we 
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gather a continuous sequence of cursor position change events to form a point action 
(mouse movement action). Table 5.1 gives a complete list of high level actions we 
derive and their corresponding definitions. 
5.2.3 Game Playing Input Analysis 
We analyze the Glider bot and human keyboard and mouse input traces with re-
spect to timing patterns (duration and inter-arrival time) and kinematics (distance, 
displacement, and velocity). Our bot analysis below is limited to the current game 
bots. 
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Two keyboard usage metrics for human and bot are presented in Figures 5.1 and 
5.2, respectively. Both figures are clipped for better presentation, and the trailing 
data clipped away contribute less than 3% of the total for either human or bot. 
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of keystroke inter-arrival time, i.e., the interval 
between two consecutive key presses, with a bin resolution of 0.1 seconds. There are 
two major differences between the bots and humans. First, the bot issues keystrokes 
significantly faster than humans. While 16.2% of consecutive keystrokes by the bot 
are less than 0.1 second apart, only 3.2% of human keystrokes are that fast. This 
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is because human players have to initiate keystroke action by physical movement 
of fingers, and hence, pressing keys at such high frequency would be very tiring. 
Second, the keystrokes of the bot exhibit obvious periodic patterns. The empirical 
probabilities of the bot pressing a key every 1 or 5.5 seconds are significantly higher 
than their neighbor intervals, which provides us some insights into the internals of the 
bot: it uses periodic timers to poll the status of the avatar (i.e., current coordinate), 
and issue keyboard commands accordingly (e.g., bypass possible obstacles by turning 
left/right and jumping). However, for human players, their keystroke intervals follow a 
Pareto distribution, which matches the conclusions of previous research [127]. Figure 
5.2 shows the distribution of keystroke durations, with the bin resolution of 0.03 
second. These figures reassures our previous observations: the bot presses keys with 
much shorter duration--over 36.9% of keystrokes are less than 0.12 seconds long, while 
only 3.9% of human keystrokes are completed within such a duration; the bot exhibits 
the periodic keyboard usage pattern-keystrokes with around 0.25 second duration 
are significantly more than its neighbor durations. 
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between the mouse speed and the displacement 
between the origin and target coordinates for the point-and-click. Less than 0.1% 
of the total data points for either human or bot are clipped away. The hots exhibit 
two very unique features. First, unlike human players, who move the mouse with very 
dynamic speed at all displacement lengths, the bots tend to move the mouse at several 
fixed speeds for each displacement, and the speed increases linearly as displacement 
lengthens. This feature implies that, again, the bots use several fixed length timers for 
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mouse movements. Second, we also observe that the bots make a significant amount 
of high speed moves with zero displacement, that is, after a series of fast movements, 
the cursor is placed back exactly at its origin. Such a behavior is absent in the human 
data, because it is physically difficult and unnecessary. 
Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of mouse drag-and-drop duration, with the bin 
resolution of 0.03 second. For the bots, 100% of actions are accomplished within 0.3 
second. However, for human players, only 56.6% of drag-and-drop actions finish 
within the same time window; over-one-second actions contribute 25.5% of the total, 
within which, about 0.8% of actions are more than 5 seconds long, and are thus clipped 
away from the figure. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the distribution of mouse movement efficiency for point-and-
click and drag-and-drop. We define movement efficiency as the ratio between the 
cursor displacement and the traversed distance over a series of movements. In other 
words, the closer the cursor movement is to a straight line between the origin and 
target coordinates, the higher the movement efficiency. Note that, while the bin 
width is 0.02, the last bin only contains the actions with efficiency of 1.0. Bots 
exhibit significant deviation from human players on this metric: 81.7% of bot mouse 
movements have perfect efficiency, compared to that only 14.1% of human mouse 
movements are equally efficient. Aside from 3.8% of mouse movements with efficiency 
less than 0.02 (most of which are zero efficiency moves, due to the cursor being placed 
back to the origin), a bot rarely moves the mouse with other efficiencies. However, 
for human players, the observed probability of mouse movement efficiency follows an 
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Finally, Figure 5.6 presents the relationship between the average mouse move speed 
and the direction of the target coordinate, plotted in polar coordinate with angular 
resolution of 10 degrees (n/36). Each arrow represents the average velocity vector 
of mouse movements whose target position is ±5 degrees in its direction. For the 
bots, there is no evident correlation between the speed and the direction. In con-
trast, for human players, there is a clear diagonal, symmetric, and bounded movement 
pattern: diagonal movements are generally faster than horizontal and vertical move-
ments, upward movements are slightly faster than downward movements, and leftward 
movements are slightly faster than rightward movements; overall, the movement speed 
is bounded to a certain value. The diagonal and symmetric pattern is attributed to 
the human hand physiology, and the speed boundary is due to the physical constraint 
of human arms. 
5.3 HOP System 
In this section, we describe the design of our proposed HOP system. The HOP system 
consists of client-side exporters and a server-side analyzer. Each client-side exporter 
collects and sends a stream of user-input actions taken at a game client to the game 
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server. The server-side analyzer then processes each input stream and decides whether 
the corresponding client is operated by a bot or a human player. Figure 5.7 illustrates 
the high-level structure of the HOP system. 
5.3.1 Client-Side Exporter 
Since each game client already receives raw user-input events, the client-side exporter 
simply uses the available information to derive input actions, i.e., keystroke, point, 
click, and drag-and-drop, and sends them back to the server along with regular 
game-related data. Ideally, the client-side exporter should be implemented as an 
integral part of the game executable or existing anti-cheat systems [39, 120, 94, 35]. 
For the prototype of our HOP system, we implement it as a standalone external 
program, as we do not have source code access to the World of Warcraft. 
5.3.2 Server-Side Analyzer 
The server-side analyzer is composed of two major components: the user-input action 
classifier and the decision maker. The work-flow of the server-side analyzer is as fol-
lows. For each user-input action stream, the system first stores consecutive actions 
into the action accumulator. A configurable number of actions form an action block, 
and each action block is then processed by the classifier. The output of the classifier 
contains the classification score for the corresponding action block, i.e., how close the 
group of actions look to those of a bot, and is stored into the output accumulator. 
Finally, when the output accumulator aggregates a configurable amount of neural net-
work output, the decision maker makes a judgment. Each judgment reflects whether 
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the player is possibly operated by a bot since the last judgment. The output accu-
mulator is refreshed after each decision is made. The analyzer continuously processes 
user-input actions throughout each user's game session. 
5.3.2.1 Neural Network Classification 
We employ artificial neural networks for user-input action classification due to the 
following two reasons. First, neural networks are especially appropriate for solving 
pattern recognition and classification problem involving a large number of parameters 
with complex inter-dependencies. The effectiveness of neural networks with user-input 
data classification has already been demonstrated in behavioral biometric identifica-
tion systems [2, 90, 91]. Second, neural networks are not simple functions of their 
inputs and outputs. While the detection methods based solely on those metrics with 
clearly defined equations are susceptible to inverse function attacks, neural networks, 
often described as a "black box", are more difficult to attack. Note that our HOP 
system is not necessarily tied to neural networks, and we will consider other classi-
fication methods, such as support vector machines (SVMs) or decision trees, in our 
future work. 
The neural network we build for the HOP system is a cascade-correlation neural 
network, a variant of feed-forward neural networks that use the idea of cascade train-
ing [41]. Unlike standard multi-layer back-propagation (BP) perceptron networks, a 
cascade correlation neural network does not have a fixed topology, but rather is built 
from the ground up. Initially, the neural network only consists of the inputs directly 
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connected to the output neuron. During the training of the neural network, a group 
of neurons are created and trained separately, and the best one is inserted into the 
network. The training process continues to include new neurons into the network, 
until the neural network reaches its training target or the size of the network reaches 
a pre-defined limit. 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the general construction of the cascade-correlation neural 
network. There are eight input values for each user-input action, including seven 
action metric parameters and a bias value that is used to differentiate the type of 
action, e.g., keyboard action or mouse action. The neural network takes input from 
all actions in an action block. The connections between the input node and neurons, 
and among neurons, are represented by intersections between a horizontal line and a 
vertical line. The weight of each connection is shown as a square over the intersection, 
where larger size indicates heavier weight. 
The seven action metric parameters are: action duration, mouse travel distance, 
displacement, efficiency, speed, angle of displacement, and virtual key (a numeric 
value corresponding to a keyboard key or a mouse button). The speed and efficiency 
are derived parameters from the basic parameters, such as duration, distance and 
displacement. These derived parameters are used mainly to help the neural network 
capture the inherent association between input parameters, reduce the network com-
plexity, and thus, speedup the training process. The number of actions in an action 
block directly affects the total amount of input data to the neural network. Increasing 
the block size provides the neural network with more context information and can, up 
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to a certain point, further improve the classification accuracy of the trained network. 
However, too many input actions can also increase the overall complexity of the neural 
network and slow down the training process. 
5.3.2.2 Decision Making 
The decision maker refers to using accumulated output from the neural network to 
determine whether the corresponding user-input data is likely from a bot or a human 
player. Different algorithms can be applied to consolidate accumulated classifications. 
We employ a simple "voting" scheme: if the majority of the neural network output 
classifies the user-input actions as those of a bot, the decision will be that the game 
is operated by a bot, and vice versa. The decision process is a summary of the clas-
sifications of user-input actions over a period of time. While individual classification 
cannot be 100% correct, the more accumulated output, the more confidence we have 
in the decision. On the other hand, the more accumulated output, the more user-
input actions are required, which translates to more data storage and longer time for 
decision making. 
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5.3.3 Performance Impact and Scalability 
The nature of MMOGs dictates our design of the HOP system to be scalable and 
light-weight, limiting performance impacts on game clients and the server. At the 
client side, the system resource consumed by the collection of user-input actions is 
minor. In addition to the system resource of a game client, an MMOG player's 
gaming experience also depends on network performance. Since the user-input actions 
are short messages, 16 bytes of data per user-input action, the additional bandwidth 
consumption induced by the client-side exporter is negligible. The presence of the 
exporter thus is imperceptible for end users. At the server side, the scalability is 
critical to the success of our HOP system. The server-side analyzer is very efficient 
in terms of memory and CPU usage, which is shown in Section 5.4.4. The size of 
additional memory consumed per player is comparable to the size of the player's 
avatar name. A single processor core is capable of processing tens of thousands of 
users simultaneously in real-time. Therefore, the HOP system is scalable to the heavy 
workload at a game server. 
5.4 Experiments 
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of our HOP system through a series of exper-
iments, in terms of detection accuracy, detection speed, and system overhead. The 
metrics we use for detection accuracy include true positive rate and true negative rate. 
The true positive rate is the percentage of hots that are correctly identified, while the 
true negative rate is the percentage of humans that are correctly identified. The de-
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tection speed is determined by the total number of actions needed to make decisions 
and the average time cost per action. In general, the larger the number of actions 
required for decisions and the higher the average time cost per action, the slower the 
detection speed becomes. 
Table 5.2: True Positive and Negative Rates vs. Thresholds and# of Accumulated 
Outputs 
Threshold # of Accumulated Outputs 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 
0.25 0.978 0.995 0.997 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.959 0.977 0.983 0.987 0.990 0.992 0.994 0.994 0.996 0.996 0.997 
0.5 0.961 0.991 0.997 0.998 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.976 0.990 0.994 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.999 
0.75 0.926 0.980 0.992 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.985 0.995 0.997 0.998 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
0.9 0.859 0.935 0.964 0.980 0.985 0.996 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.991 0.998 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
0.95 0.775 0.856 0.895 0.922 0.940 0.947 0.958 0.969 0.976 0.975 0.983 0.994 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
0.975 0.624 0.668 0.700 0.723 0.737 0.757 0.770 0.776 0.792 0.796 0.804 0.996 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
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5.4.1 Experimental Setup 
Our experiments are based on 95 hours of traces, including 55 hours of human traces 
and 40 hours of game bot traces. In total, these traces contain 3,000,066 raw user-
input events and 286,626 user-input actions, with 10 bot instances and 30 humans 
involved. The 10 bot instances are generated by running the Glider bot with 10 
different profiles. The human players are a diverse group, including men and women 
with different ages and different levels of gaming experience. The more detailed trace 
information has been given in Section 5.2.2. 
The experiments are conducted using 10-fold cross validation. Each test is per-
formed on a different human or bot that is left out of the training set for that test. 
Therefore, to validate a given configuration, 20 different partitions are created, one for 
each of the 10 bots and 10 sets of three humans. The partitions consist of a training 
set of either 9 bots and 30 humans or 10 bots and 27 humans, and a test set of either 
one bot or three humans. Thus, each test is performed on unknown data that the 
system has not yet been trained on. 
5.4.2 Detection Results 
The HOP system has four configurable parameters: the number of actions per block, 
the number of nodes, the threshold, and the number of outputs per output block. The 
first two parameters mainly determine the size and complexity of the neural network, 
while the second two parameters largely affect the detection performance of the entire 
system. The threshold determines how a neural network output is interpreted: a 
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value over the threshold indicates a bot, while a value under the threshold indicates 
a human. Note that humans have a value of 0.0 and bots have a value of 1.0 in the 
training of the neural network. 
We first configure the number of actions per block and the number of nodes. The 
true positive and true negative rates with different numbers of actions and different 
numbers of nodes are shown in Figure 5.9 (a) and (b), respectively. These tests are 
performed with a default threshold of 0.5. The neural network becomes more accurate 
as more actions are provided, but we see diminishing returns in accuracy as the number 
of actions increases, e.g., going from 4 actions to 6 actions requires 50% more input 
but only provides a relatively small increase in the overall accuracy. 
In most cases, the binomial theorem predicts that combining three decisions for 
the 4-action neural network should be more accurate than combining two decisions 
for the 6- or 8-action neural networks. Therefore, we choose to use a neural network 
with 4 actions as input, which gives true positive and negative rates of 0.971-0.977 
and 0.959-0.973, respectively. 
The overall true positive and negative rates do not always grow as the number of 
nodes increases. At some points, increasing the number of nodes no longer improves 
the true positive or negative rates and the neural network starts to over-fit the training 
set. A neural network of 40 nodes provides a true positive rate of 0.976 and a true 
negative rate of 0.961, which is the best combination of true positive and true negative 
rates with 4 actions as input. Therefore, we set up the neural network based on this 
configuration. 
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With the neural network configured, the threshold and the number of outputs per 
block determine the overall performance of the system. The threshold can be increased 
or decreased from the default value of 0.5 to bias the neural network towards bots or 
humans, improving the true positive rate or the true negative rate, respectively. The 
number of outputs per block affects both the detection accuracy and the detection 
speed of the system. As the number of outputs per block increases, the detection 
accuracy of the system increases, but the detection speed decreases as more neural 
network outputs are needed to make decisions. 
The true positive and negative rates with different thresholds and different num-
bers of outputs for hots and humans are listed in Table 5.2. The top number in each 
cell is the true positive rate and the bottom number is the true negative rate. The 
neural network has 40 nodes and takes 4 actions as input. There are a number of 
settings that allow for a true positive or true negative rate of 1.0, though not both. 
To avoid a false positive---mistaking a human for a bot, we prefer a high true negative 
rate. The smallest number of outputs per block that achieves a true negative rate of 
1.0 is 9 outputs per block with the threshold of 0.75, which gives a true positive rate 
of 0.998. 
Table 5.3: True Positive Rates for Bots 
Bots 
#1 1 #2 1 #3 1 #4 1 #5 1 #6 1 #7 1 #8 1 #9 1 #10 
o.988 1 1.ooo 1 o.998 1 1.ooo 1 1.ooo 1 1.ooo 1 1.ooo 1 1.ooo 1 o.998 1 1.ooo 
With the fully configured system ( 40 nodes, 4-action input, the threshold of 0. 75, 
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and 9 outputs per block), Table 5.3 lists the true positive and negative rates for each 
of the individual bats in our traces. The true negative rates are 1.0 for all of the 
humans, so none of the human players in our traces are misclassified as bats. The 
true positive rates are between 0.988 and 1.000 for the bats in our traces, with the 
average true positive rate of 0.998. 
The detection speed of the system is a function of the total number of actions 
required for decision making and the average time cost per action. The total number 
of actions is 36 (i.e., 9 outputs x 4 actions per output). The time cost per action 
varies. The average time cost per action, ignoring idle periods longer than 10 seconds, 
is 1.10 seconds. If a player is idle, strictly speaking, no one is "operating" the game, so 
no decision can be made. Of course, idle players (bats or humans) are not performing 
any actions and should not be a concern. Based on the total number of actions and 
the average time cost per action, Figure 5.10 illustrates the decision time distribution 
for bats and humans. From the decision time distribution, we can see that our HOP 
system is able to make decisions for capturing bats within 39.60 seconds on average. 
Note that we perform the same experiments with BP neural networks and observe 
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that the cascade neural network is more accurate in bot classification than BP neural 
networks that use incremental, quick propagation, or resilient propagation method. 
5.4.3 Detection of Other Game Bots 
To further test our HOP system, without retraining the neural network, we perform a 
smaller experiment on a different game bot from a different game. While Diablo 2 is 
not an MMOG, it has an MMOG-like economy (items may be traded with thousands 
· of other players) and is also plagued by game bots. This set of experiments studies 
MMBot, a popular free bot for Diablo 2 that is built using the Autolt scripting 
language [10]. Similar to Glider, MMBot automates various tasks in the game to 
accumulate treasure or experience. However, unlike Glider, MMBot does not read 
the memory space of the game, but instead is based entirely on keyboard/mouse 
automation, and pixel scanning. As Diablo 2 has a much different interface (top-
down isometric view rather than first person view like World of Warcraft) and much 
different controls, the purpose of these experiments is to test how general our system 
is and to show that it is not limited to any specific bot or game. 
We collect a total of 20 hours of Diablo 2 traces, both bot and human. We run 
MMBot for 10 hours and have 5 humans play Diablo 2 for a total of 10 hours. We then 
reuse our existing neural network ( 40 nodes, 4 action-input, 9 inputs per block) with 
the adjusted threshold value to optimize our detection results. Without retraining, 
the neural network achieves a true positive rate of 0.864 on the bot and a true negative 
rate of 1.0 on the human players. This result shows that our HOP system is able to 
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capture certain invariants in the behavior of bots across different games and different 
bot implementations, indicating the possible potential of HOP-based systems for other 
applications. 
5.4.4 System Overhead 
Our proposed system at the server side (i.e., the server-side analyzer) is required 
to process thousands of users simultaneously in real-time, so it must be efficient in 
terms of memory and computation. Now we estimate the overhead of the analyzer 
for supporting 5,000 users, far more than the regular workload of a typical World of 
Warcraft server. The analyzer process, which includes the neural network, is profiled 
using valgrind and consumes only 37 KBytes of memory during operation. The 
prototype of our system is designed to use a single-thread multiple-client model with 
time-multiplexing, and thus only one process is used. Of course, additional processes 
could be used to process in parallel. 
The primary memory requirement is to accommodate the accumulated user-input 
actions and neural network outputs for each online user. A single user-input action 
consumes 16 bytes, 4 bytes each for distance, duration, and displacement, and 2 bytes 
each for virtual key and angle. A block of 4 user-input actions consumes 64 bytes. 
A block of up to 16 neural network outputs requires 2 bytes as a bit-array. The per-
user memory requirement is approximately 66 bytes, barely more than the maximum 
length of account names on World of Warcraft, which is 64 bytes. If 66 bytes is scaled 
to 5,000 online users, this is only 330 KBytes in total, which is negligible considering 
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that the game currently stores the position, level, health, and literally dozens of other 
attributes and items for each user. 
The computational overhead is also very low. The computation time for processing 
all 95 hours of traces is measured using the Linux time command. The analyzer can 
process the full set of traces, over 286,626 user-input actions, in only 385 milliseconds 
on a Pentium 4 Xeon 3.0Ghz. In other words, the analyzer can process approximately 
296 hours of traces per second using a single CPU. A server with 5,000 users would 
generate approximately 1.38 hours of traces per second, a tiny fraction of the above 
processing rate. 
5.5 Related Work 
Exploiting online games has attracted increasing interest in recent years. Yan et al. 
[133] summarized commonly-used exploiting methods in online games and categorized 
them along three dimensions: vulnerability, consequence, and exploiter. In addition, 
they pointed out that fairness should be taken into account to understand game ex-
ploits. Webb et al. (126] presented a different classification of game exploits. They 
categorized 15 types of exploits into four levels: game, application, protocol, and in-
frastructure, and discussed countermeasures for both client-server and peer-to-peer 
architectures. Muttik [89] surveyed security threats emerging in MMOGs, and dis-
cussed potential solutions to secure online games from multiple perspectives including 
technology, economy, and human factor. Hoglund and McGraw [54] provided a com-
prehensive coverage of game exploits in MMOGs, shedding light on a number of topics 
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and issues. 
5.5.1 Anti-Cheating 
With the ever-increasing severity of game exploits, securing online games has received 
wide attention. The research work on anti-cheating generally can be classified into two 
categories: game cheating prevention and game cheating detection. The former refers 
to the mechanisms that deter game cheating from happening and the latter comprises 
the methods that identify occurrences of cheating in a game. For MMOGs, a cheat-
proof design, especially the design of the game client program and the communication 
protocol, is essential to prevent most of game exploits from occurring. This is because 
(1) the client program of an MMOG is under the full control of a game player and 
(2) the communication at the client side might be manipulated for the advantage of 
player. 
The prevention of game exploits has been the subject of a number of works. Baugh-
man et al. [8] uncovered the possibility of time cheats (e.g., look-ahead and suppress-
correct cheats) through exploiting communication protocols for both centralized and 
distributed online games, and designed a lockstep protocol, which tightly synchronizes 
the message communication via two-phase commitment, to prevent cheats. Following 
their work, a number of other time-cheat-resistant protocols [29, 34, 23] have been 
developed. In [86], Monch et al. proposed a framework for preventing game client 
programs from being tampered with. The framework employs mobile guards, small 
pieces of code dynamically downloaded from the game server, to validate and protect 
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the game client. Yampolskiy et al. [132] devised a protection mechanism for online 
card games, which embeds CAPTCHA tests in the cards by replacing the card face 
with text. Besides software approaches, hardware-based approaches to countering 
game exploits have also been proposed. Golle et al. [50] presented a special hardware 
device that implements physical CAPTCHA tests. The device can prevent game bots 
based on the premise that physical CAPTCHA tests such as pressing certain buttons 
are too difficult for bots to resolve without human involvement. 
In practice, it is extremely hard to eliminate all potential game exploits. Thus, 
accurate and quick detection of game exploits is critical for securing on-line games. 
Since game bots are a commonly-used exploit, a fair amount of research has focused on 
detecting and countering them. Based on traffic analysis, Chen et al. [24] found that 
the traffic generated by the official client differs from that generated by standalone bot 
programs. Their approach, however, is not effective against recent game bots, as the 
majority of current MMOG bots interact with official clients. In [25, 26], the difference 
of movement paths between human players and bots in a first-person shooter (FPS) 
game is revealed and then used for the development of trajectory-based detection 
methods. However, it is unlikely that this type of detection method can achieve similar 
speed and accuracy in MMOGs, because maps used in MMOGs are much larger than 
those in FPS games and avatar trajectories in MMOGs are far more complicated. 
Indeed, Mitterhofer et al. [83] used movement paths in World of Warcraft and their 
method requires from 12 to 60 minutes to detect game bots. Thawonmas et al. [115] 
introduced a behavior-based bot detection method, which relies on discrepancies in 
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action frequencies between human players and bots. However, compared to our work, 
the metric used for their detection, action frequency, is coarse-grained and has low 
discriminability, resulting in low detection ratio (0.36 recall ratio on average) and long 
detection time (at least 15 minutes). 
As game clients in general cannot be trusted, usually the detection decision is 
made at servers. Schluessler et al. [106] presented a client-side detection scheme, 
which detects input data generated by game bots by utilizing special hardware. The 
hardware is used to provide a tamper-resistant environment for the detection module. 
The detection module compares the input data generated by input devices (mouse 
and keyboard) with those consumed by the game application and fires an alert once 
a discrepancy is found. 
5.5.2 Behavioral Biometrics 
The idea of HOPs is largely inspired by behavioral biometrics based on keystroke 
dynamics [60, 87, 11, 96] and mouse dynamics [2, 43, 103]. Analogous to handwritten 
signatures, keystroke dynamics and mouse dynamics are regarded as unique to each 
person. Therefore, their applications in user authentication and identification have 
been extensively investigated [60, 87, 11, 96, 103, 43, 2]. Generating synthetic mouse 
dynamics from real mouse actions has also been studied [90, 91]. In spite of the fact 
that our system also utilizes the characteristics of keystroke and mouse dynamics, it 
significantly differs from aforementioned biometric systems in that our system lever-
ages the distinction on game play between human players and game bots, which is 
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reflected by keystroke and mouse dynamics, to distinguish human players from game 
hots. In contrast, those biometric systems exploit the uniqueness of keystroke dynam-
ics or mouse dynamics for identification, i.e., matching a person with his/her identity 
on the basis of either dynamics. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented a game bot defense system that utilizes HOPs to detect 
game bots. The proposed HOPs leverage the differences of game playing behaviors 
such as keyboard and mouse actions between human players and game bots to identify 
bot programs. Compared to conventional HIPs such as CAPTCHAs, HOPs are trans-
parent to users and work in a continuous manner. We collected 95-hour user-input 
traces from World of Warcraft. By carefully analyzing the traces, we revealed that 
there exist significant differences between bots and humans in a variety of character-
istics derived from game playing actions, which motivate the design of the proposed 
HOP defense system. 
The HOP defense system comprises a client-side exporter and a server-side ana-
lyzer. The exporter is used to transmit a stream of user-input actions and the analyzer 
is used to process the action stream to capture bots. The core of the analyzer is a 
cascade-correlation neural network, which takes an action stream as input and deter-
mines if the stream generator is a bot or a human player. We also employed a simple 
voting algorithm to further improve detection accuracy. Based on the collected user-
input traces, we conducted a series of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
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defense system under different configurations. Our results show that the system can 
detect over 99% of current game hots with no false positives within a minute and the 
overhead of the detection is negligible or minor in terms of induced network traffic, 
CPU, and memory cost. As our detection engine only relies on user-input information, 
our HOP system is generic to MMOGs. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
This dissertation explores applications of information theory and statistical learning 
to anomaly detection. Specifically, we address two very important and challenging 
problems in network and system security, (1) detecting covert timing channels, and 
(2) determining if a user is a human or a bot. For the first problem, we developed an 
entropy-based approach for detecting covert timing channels. For the second problem, 
we developed a hybrid classification system, based on entropy and statistical learning, 
for detecting chat hots, and a game bot defense system, based on statistical learning, 
for detecting game bots. 
To detect covert timing channels, which could leak sensitive information from a 
system or network, we first studied covert timing channel design, and modeled, sim-
ulated, and tested different covert timing channels to better understand their charac-
teristics. Based on the observation that the creation of a covert timing channel has 
certain effects on the entropy of the original process, we developed an entropy-based 
approach to detecting covert timing channels. We implemented our entropy-based 
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approach using entropy and corrected conditional entropy. Our experimental results 
show that our entropy-based approach is sensitive to current covert timing channels 
and capable of detecting them. 
To defend against bots, which abuse various network applications, including chat, 
online games, web sites, and so on, we developed two different detection systems for 
bots in different network applications, chat and online games. 
First, we conducted a large-scale measurement study on a major commercial chat 
service, Yahoo! Chat, capturing over 1400 hours of chat logs. Based on the mea-
surement study, we proposed a hybrid classification system to differentiate bots from 
humans. The hybrid classification system consists of entropy-based (entropy and 
corrected conditional entropy) and statistical-learning-based (Bayesian classification) 
classifiers. The two classifiers complement each other in detection. The entropy-
based classifier is more effective against unknown or zero-day chat bots, whereas the 
statistical-learning-based classifier is faster against known chat hots. Our experimen-
tal results show that the hybrid classification system is able to quickly classify known 
chat bots and accurately classify previously unknown chat hots. 
Second, we collect game play traces for a popular massive multiplayer online game, 
World of Warcraft, capturing 95 hours of game play. The traces show various differ-
ences between humans and bots in their user-input characteristics. In addition, we 
observe that some actions with the game are difficult for hots to perform in a human-
like manner due to the need to process complex visuals in real-time. Based on these 
observations, we developed a HOP-based game bot defense system that analyzes user-
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input actions and uses a cascade-correlation neural network to determine if users are 
humans or bots. Our experimental results show that the HOP-based game bot defense 
system is highly effective against current game bots, raising the bar for attackers. 
6.1 Future Work 
Our future work will pursue several extensions to our entropy-based approach to 
detecting covert channels, our hybrid approach to detecting chat bots, and our sta-
tistical learning and human-observational-proof-based approach to detecting online 
game bots. 
First, we will determine how our entropy-based approach and other detection 
methods limit the capacity of covert timing channels. By measuring how detection 
methods constrain capacity, we get a broader view of how detection methods enhance 
overall covert timing channel defense. In addition, we believe that this further explo-
ration will lead to better detection methods that further limit covert timing channel 
capacities. 
Second, we also will look at more advanced and human-like chat bots that could 
evade our hybrid classification system. It is possible for more advanced chat bots 
to look more human-like in their inter-message delay and message size statistics. By 
combining the characteristics of responder bots and replay bots, a new bot could 
take on the approximate inter-message delay and message size entropy of humans and 
possibly evade our hybrid classification system. 
Third, we also plan to extend our HOP-based detection system to other interactive 
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applications outside of online games. A number of interactive web applications, such as 
social networking sites, blogs, and web-based e-mail services, all of which are plagued 
by bots, could represent possible applications for such a system. 
146 
Appendix A 
Chat Bot Examples 
A.O.l Response Example 
bot: user!, that's a damn good question. 
bot: user!, To know more about Seventh-day Adventist; visit http://www.sda.org 
bot: user2, no! don't leave me. 
bot: user!, too much coffee tonight? 
bot: user2, boy, you're just full of questions, aren't you? 
bot: user2, lots of evidence for evolution can be found here http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs 
In the above example, the bot uses a template with three parts to post links: 
[username], [link description phrase] [link]. 
A.0.2 Synonym Example 
bot: Allo Hunks! Enjoy Marjorie! Check My Free Pies 
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bot: What's happening Guys! Marjorie Here! See more of me at My Free Pies 
bot: Hi Babes! I am Marjorie! Rate My Live Cam 
bot: Horny lover Guys! Marjorie at your service! Inspect My Site 
bot: Mmmm Folks! Im Marjorie! View My Webpage 
A.0.3 Padding Example 
bot: anyone boredjn wanna chat?uklcss 
bot: any guystfrom the US/Canada hereiqjss 
bot: hiyafxqss 
bot: ne1 hereqbored?fiqss 
bot: ne guysmwanna chat? ciuneed some1 to make megsmile :-)pktpss 
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